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ABSTRACT 
 What are the advantages and disadvantages of pushing A-10 operations away 
from main operating bases (MOBs) in future operating environments? What are the 
critical requirements, risks, and challenges associated with operating from forward 
locations? The conventional U.S. Air Force understands that it will need to operate away 
from MOBs in future conflicts in order to project forward, remain tactically 
unpredictable, increase combat resiliency, and ultimately win. Research on 
non-traditional basing strategies has garnered many terms: Agile basing, adaptive basing, 
forward basing, FARP operations, austere operations, distributed basing, untethered 
operations, disaggregated basing, lily-pad strategy, and Rapid-X among others. This 
study analyzes the A-10 enterprise’s ability to operate away from a MOB, in austere 
environments, to provide fire support to special operations forces. This study shows 
adequate potential of the A-10 enterprise to operate in austere environments bringing 
significant benefits to the joint force without substantial risk. The demonstrated capability 
during the Cold War, Desert Storm, and recent SOF-specific exercises highlight tangible 
benefits that bode well for future conflicts. 
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I. HISTORICAL LOOK AT ADAPTIVE BASING 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
In the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
stated “much of our force employment models and posture date to the immediate post-Cold 
War era, when our military advantage was unchallenged.”1 For the U.S. Air Force (USAF), 
this has meant flying unchallenged, unthreatened, under an air supremacy umbrella from 
Main Operating Bases (MOBs) nearly impervious to enemy attack. Vulnerable high value 
air assets (HVAA) and tanker aircraft presently operate within miles of the front lines 
unthreatened from air defenses. A 72-hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle provides 
adequate flexibility against predictable enemies. A centralized Command and Control (C2) 
structure pulls tactical decisions away from flight leads and lower level commanders. 
The NDS and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) acknowledge that the post-Cold 
War focus on defeating rogue regimes has been replaced by strategic competition from 
peer or near-peer advisories and protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks requires the 
ability to interdict terrorist cells worldwide. The NDS states U.S. and coalition forces must 
posture forward and remain agile, capable, resilient, and unpredictable to succeed in future 
conflicts.2 The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review goes on to say the Department of Defense 
will:  
enhance capabilities to disperse land-based and naval expeditionary forces 
to other bases and operating sites, providing the ability to operate and 
maintain front-line combat aircraft from austere bases while using only a 
small complement of logistical and support personnel and equipment.3 
For the USAF, increasing agility and survivability potentially means projecting 
forward from MOBs, distributing airplanes and logistical support to strategically 
                                                 
1 Jim Mattis, National Defense Strategy: Unclassified Summary (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf, 4.  
2 Mattis, National Defense Strategy: Unclassified Summary, 7. 
3 Martin E. Dempsey, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 
2014), 38. 
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advantageous locations, moving away from centralized command and control, operating in 
a contested environment, and developing the ability to rapidly deploy a scalable force and 
operate in all areas of the world to defeat any future advisory. In a 2018 speech, General 
Mike Holmes, commander of Air Force Air Combat Command (ACC) stated: 
ACC will train its junior officers in how to quickly deploy small groups of 
aircraft to austere fields, quickly move them again in order to avoid being 
hit, and make those calls on their own initiative, it will mean driving 
decision making authority to lower and lower levels and expecting young 
leaders to use their wits to carry out “commander’s intent.4 
The concept of operating away from MOBs is not new. Fighter units regularly 
trained to operate from contingency locations in Europe during the Cold War. In Desert 
Storm, A-10s utilized forward operating locations (FOLs) to extend their range and 
expedite rearming for SCUD hunting missions in western Iraq. Since the end of Desert 
Storm, the conventional Air Force has migrated back towards operating from MOBs and 
abandoned some of key maintenance practices that facilitate adaptive basing and operating 
in austere environments.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the DOD leverage the A-10’s ability to operate from forward operating 
locations to provide flexible, rapidly deployable, and lethal fires support to current and 
future operations areas in support of SOF? 
• What are the benefits and risks of operating away from MOBs? 
• What theaters, missions, and OPLANs can benefit from adaptive basing at 
FOLs?  
• What is the current capability and LIMFACs of the A-10 enterprise to 
operate in austere environments? 
                                                 




To address these questions, the thesis will analyze several potential advantages and 
disadvantages of applications of adaptive basing and executing forward arming and 
refueling at a FOL. These potential advantages include:  
• Positioning airplanes closer to an operating area, reducing transit times, 
minimizing tanker support requirements, and maximizing on-station time. 
• Quicker refueling and rearming, getting airplanes back to the fight faster. 
• Pre-staging assets to provide responsive on-call personnel recovery (PR) 
or quick reaction force (QRF) support. 
• Allows aircraft to rapidly deploy to new Areas of Responsibility (AORs) 
before an airbase infrastructure can be built or acquired. 
• Minimizing targetable signature for surface-to-surface missiles in an Anti-
Access Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. 
• Distributing airplanes to reduce the effect of a MOB attack. 
• Maximizing flexibility to adapt to changes in mission timelines. 
• Enabling pilots to project forward, face-to-face mission plan, brief, and 
rehearse with the supported force. 
Potential disadvantages include: 
• Maintenance complications while operating away from a MOB. 
• Operating an airfield without robust security forces or firefighting 
services. 
• Weather impacts on flying operations and non-traditional runway surfaces. 
• Centralized command and control challenges. 
• Challenging logistical support. 
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These potential advantages and disadvantages are not platform specific. They may 
apply to any airplane with the ability to land and operate temporarily away from a MOB. 
This thesis will focus on operations and applications of A-10 aircraft in support of special 
operations forces (SOF). The A-10, with high mounted turbofan engines, rugged landing 
gear, and maintenance simplicity, allow it to operate from areas not accessible to other jet 
aircraft. 
C. KEY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
Adaptive Basing—A basing strategy that leverages “alternate basing options to 
enable flying operations. It calls for forces to disaggregate capabilities from a single base 
and disperse forces and capabilities to many locations for operational maneuver.”5 
Agile Basing—The ability to move rapidly from base to base, or relocate base 
infrastructure and logistical support to a new location in a combat environment.  
Distributed Basing—A concept of basing airplanes in small groups at multiple 
airfields as opposed to basing airplanes in large groups at a central location. 
Austere Airbase—A runway with little to no existing infrastructure. 
Semi-Prepared Surface—An unpaved runway surface (Gravel/Dirt). “Semi-
prepared surfaces may include deserts, dry lakebeds, flat valley floors, dirt roads.”6  
Unimproved Surface—Same as semi-prepared surface, includes deserts, dry 
lakebeds, flat valley floors, dirt roads.  
Prepared Surface—A paved runway surface (concrete). “Prepared surfaces may 
include airfields, roads, highways, or other paved surfaces.”7 
                                                 
5 Patrick Mills et al., Estimating Air Force Deployment Requirements for Lean Force Packages: A 
Methodology and Decision Support Tool Prototype (Santa Monica, CA. RAND Corporation, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1800/RR1855/RAND_RR1855.pdf, 22.; 
David Dammeier, Meka Toliver, and Logan Smith, “Future Concepts: Overcoming a Power Projection 
Problem,” Air Force Civil Engineering Center, Spring 2016, https://www.afcec.af.mil/News/CE-
Online/Article-Display/Article/1004470/overcoming-a-power-projection-problem. 
6 Department of the Air Force, Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operation, AFI 13–217 with AFSOC 
Supplement (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2007, AFSOC Supplement 2014), 
http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/afsoc/publication/afi13-217_afsocsup/afi13-217_afsocsup.pdf.  
7 Department of the Air Force, Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations. 
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Forward Operating Location (FOL) / Forward Operating Base (FOB)—"An airfield 
used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities.”8 
Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP)—"A temporary facility, organized, 
equipped, and deployed to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of 
aviation maneuver units in combat.”9 Sometimes abbreviated as FAARP to distinguish it 
from the Air Force specific acronym that does not include Arming. 
Integrated Combat Turnaround (ICT)—The process of refueling, reloading, and 
providing general aircraft servicing with one or more engines running. Similar terms are 
hot pitting, concurrent servicing. 
Untethered Operations—The ability to operate fighter aircraft and generate sorties 
from forward bases without being “tethered” to MOBs10 
Mission-Type Orders—"An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying 
how it is to be accomplished.”11 
Mission Command—"The conduct of military operations through decentralized 
execution based upon mission-type orders.”12 
D. CURRENT A-10 FARP TRAINING AND CAPABILITY 
Since 2007, the Air Force A-10 community began developing new tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and reinvigorating old TTPs to operate in austere 
environments away from MOBs, on dirt runways or unimproved surfaces with little to no 
                                                 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1–02 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-09-28-100314-687 
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. AFI 11–
235 defines FARP as Forward Area Refueling Point. AFI 11–235 strictly discusses refueling from cargo 
aircraft does not address refueling from other platforms or reloading weapons at the forward area. For the 
purposes of this paper, the JP 1–02 of FARP will be used. 
10 Adapted from Charles Brown, Bradley Spacey, and Charles Glover, “Untethered Operations: Rapid 
Mobility and Forward Basing Are Keys to Airpower’s Success in the A2/AD Environment.” Air and Space 
Power Journal (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 2015), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a618930.pdf. 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
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infrastructure or external support. Tactics Improvement Proposal (TIP) 04–0401 directed 
the A-10 test community to undertake Tactics Development and Evaluation (TD&E) to 
evaluate the A-10s ability to utilize a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) in an 
austere environment. The TIP stated “A-10s were sometimes required to operate from 
austere forward operating locations because of the unavailability of airborne refueling due 
to either air threat or lack of tankers”13  
Air Combat Command (ACC) Project 06–025A A-10 Forward Area Arming and 
Refueling Tactics and Development and Evaluation concluded in 2009. The project 
codified procedures to operate and refuel at a forward location from Air Force Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC) platforms (MC-130) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
platforms (C-17, C-130). The project demonstrated the A-10s ability to operate from 
unimproved and non-traditional runway surfaces and developed a pilot training program to 
qualify pilots in unimproved surface landings. Although it was an objective of Project 06–
025A, it did not develop TTPs or Technical Order (T.O.) data to rearm A-10s in an austere 
environment due to a lack of a tasking for ACC maintainers to hold the qualification, 
resulting in no qualified maintainers available for the test. 
Since Project 06–025A Final Report was published in March 2009, operational A-
10 units and the A-10 division of the United States Air Force Weapons School (USAFWS) 
trained pilots on FARP procedures and unimproved surface landings. A-10 operational 
units qualify a majority of pilots in unimproved runway and refueling operations. However, 
without specific training for maintenance personnel to rearm jets in austere environments, 
the capability never reached an operational status.  
In November 2016, an A-10 reserve unit, through its own motivation and extensive 
self-derived training program, completed the first full-scale exercise encompassing all 
aspects of FARP from an austere environment. The 303 FS certified the first deployable 
Operations and Maintenance Unit Tasking Code (UTC) capable of supporting full scale 
                                                 
13 USAF Warfare Center, A-10 Forward Area Arming and Refueling Tactics Development and 
Evaluation Final Report, ACC Project 06–025A Report (Nellis AFB, NV: Air Combat Command, 2009), 
2. 
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FARP operations from austere locations.14 The success of the 303rd FS UTC creation did 
not resonate throughout the rest of the A-10 community or higher headquarters. As of 
November 2018, they remain the only unit capable of deploying with this capability. 
E. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
1. The Cold War 
The concept of dispersed modern fighter basing originally surfaced after Vietnam 
as a tactic to counter a Soviet Invasion in Western Europe. The Air Force conducted and 
sponsored numerous studies on basing operations in Europe. After several studies, the Air 
Force decided on basing A-10s at MOBs in England and deploy them forward to the 
European mainland if required.15 The concept made sense based on the threat. Planners in 
Europe acknowledged the A-10 was needed to counter mass amounts of Soviet armor. The 
A-10 needed the ability to rapidly rearm at FOLs and return to the fight without returning 
to England. Establishing MOBs on the European mainland made them vulnerable to 
Russian attack. In response, six squadrons of A-10s were based in England. Each squadron 
made routine exercise deployments to FOLs in Europe.16  
A 1987 study by RAND, titled Tactical Dispersal of Fighter Aircraft: Risk, 
Uncertainty, and Policy Recommendations, author John Halliday ran a series of 
simulations comparing European basing options. His simulations suggested a mix of 
MOBs and distributed operating locations (DOLs) provided the most amount of protection 
against a Soviet attack. He accurately points out that the European basing structure at the 
time was not based on any coherent strategy, but rather an evolutionary necessity of the 
international political process.17 In 1987, the main threat to U.S. airbases in Europe came 
from a direct airborne attack by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) fighters and 
                                                 
14 Anthony Roe. “2016 Nellis AFB “Strike 2.0” 442 FW Deployment After Action Report.” 
(Whiteman AFB, MO: 442 Fighter Wing, 2016). 
15 Douglas N. Campbell, The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2003), 126 
16 Campbell, The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate, 129–131. 
17 John M. Halliday, Tactical Dispersal of Fighter Aircraft: Risk, Uncertainty, and Policy 
Recommendations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1987), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2443.html, 4. 
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bombers. Halliday cites several key historical events to show the vulnerability and 
devastation caused by a successful air attack. Most notably, Halliday references the Israeli 
attack on Egyptian airfields in 1967 that destroyed 416 Arab planes, 393 of which were 
ground kills. In turn, the Israeli Air Force lost merely 26 aircraft.18 Halliday’s simulations 
conclude tactical dispersal of aircraft to DOLs will significantly lower the impact of an 
airfield attack and lead to sustained aircraft sortie generation. Of note, he did not do a deep 
dive into sustaining DOLs but expected essential supplies like POL and munitions to be a 
mixture of pre-staged and ground delivered supplies throughout western Europe.  
In Halliday’s study, the key goal was aircraft survival while on the ground and 
maintaining sortie generation, not to decrease distance to the front lines, provide quicker 
aircraft and weapons turnaround, or extend the range of unrefueled fighters. At the time, 
long range strategic surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) were not as significant of a 
factor, which permitted the use of tankers for AAR near the front lines. In 1987, the most 
capable long-range SAM, the SA-10 (S-300 V1) had a nominal range of 90 km and served 
mostly as point defense around Moscow.19 Additionally, since highly accurate 
conventional ballistic and cruise missiles did not exist yet, or pose a significant threat to 
European airbases, commanders assumed they would have some sort of advance warning 
to launch alert fighters to counter a Soviet air attack. 
In 1988, Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany conducted the Salty Demo to simulate 
a sustained air attack on a MOB. The demo illustrated the vulnerability of MOBs and severe 
degradation to air operations caused by an enemy air attack. Recommendations focused on 
hardening MOBs, stockpiling key infrastructure repair equipment, employing camouflage, 
concealment and deception (CCD), and making more taxi and runway surfaces available 
for use.20 
                                                 
18 Halliday, Tactical Dispesal of Fighter Aircraft: Risk, Uncertainty, and Policy Recommendations, 13. 
19 Federation of American Scientists. n.d. SA-10 Grumble. Accessed October 15, 2108. 
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300pmu.htm. 
20 Christopher J. Bowie, “The Lessons of Salty Demo” Air Force Magazine (March 2009). 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/March%202009/0309salty.aspx. 
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A second RAND study, A Perspective on USAFE Collocated Operating Base 
System, conducted in the same era by Lewis et al., analyzed the use of collocated operating 
bases (COBs) throughout Europe. COBs, in concept, would be used to bed down the influx 
of tactical aircraft in the event of an invasion by the USSR. At the height of the cold war, 
the U.S. Air Force had around 500 tactical fighter aircraft based in Europe. War plans 
called for an additional 1000 to deploy and bed down in Europe.21 The influx of airplanes 
would use COBs for the duration of the deployment. At the time of the Lewis study, NATO 
had 43 fully functioning COBs with adequate equipment to sustain aircraft bed down.22 
USAFE desired 70 COBs by FY 1991, but the requirement dissolved as the Soviet Union 
weakened in the late 80’s and ultimately collapsed in 1991.23  
Many of the Cold War COBs and MOBs were abandoned or transferred to civil 
authorities, but could potentially be used today if required for contingency operations. 
Bitburg municipal airport (ICAO: EDRB) in western Germany is a good example. At its 
height, three squadrons of U.S. F-15s were based at Bitburg Airbase. The base was 
transferred back to Germany in 1994 as part of the post-Cold War draw down.24 Bitburg’s 
10026x148 foot runway could still support fighter and cargo aircraft operations, and a 
multitude of the abandoned hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) could potentially be used for 
aircraft or equipment.25 
2. Desert Storm 
As the Cold War drew to an end, focus turned to Iraq in 1991, and eliminated the 
large-scale pursuit and study of distributed or adaptive basing operations. During Desert 
Storm A-10s utilized two FOLs in western Saudi Arabia to refuel and rearm during SCUD 
hunting missions in western Iraq. Figure 15 shows these locations. William Smallwood’s 
                                                 
21 Halliday, Tactical Dispesal of Fighter Aircraft: Risk, Uncertainty, and Policy Recommendations, 5. 
22 Donald Lewis et al. A Perspective on the USAFE Collocated Operating Base System (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 1986), 4. 
23 Lewis et al., A Perspective on the USAFE Collocated Operating Base System, 4. 
24 Jennifer H. Svan, “Americans close door on operations at Bitburg after more than 60 years.” Stars 
and Stripes, November 7, 2017, https://www.stripes.com/news/americans-close-door-on-operations-at-
bitburg-after-more-than-60-years-1.496618. 
25 Runway data pulled from www.skyvector.com 
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Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War describes how the A-10 effectively used 
integrated combat turnarounds (ICTs) at Al Jouf and KKMC. Smallwood recounts how 
pilots would often fly 3 missions per day without leaving the cockpit.26 Smallwood’s 
writing is an entertaining narrative, not an academic research piece, however several useful 
FARP concepts can be pulled from Smallwood’s text: 
• A-10s effectively used FARPs at FOLs to extend its combat range without 
relying on tanker support. 
• FARPs enabled pilots to return to the target area quickly with new 
weapons. Returning to the MOB took significantly longer and required 
tanker support. Simply refueling at a tanker and returning to the target area 
did not replenish weapons. 
• FOLs required only a minimal footprint of essential personnel and 
equipment to operate effectively. 
William Smallwood’s book Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War recounts the 
details of one of the most successful A-10 missions in Desert Storm. On February 25, 1991, 
one 2-ship of A-10s, piloted by Captain Eric “Fish” Salomonson and Lieutenant John 
“Karl” Marks destroyed 23 Iraqi tanks and damaged up to 10 additional tanks in one day. 
Most of the kills were by AGM-65 Maverick missiles with the remainder from 30mm 
Combat Mix. Salomonson and Marks FARPed two times at a FOL in Saudi Arabia 
allowing them to return to the target area quicker reloaded with the deadly AGM-65s. In 
addition to killing the tanks, the duo supported several Marine units in desperate need of 
close air support (CAS).27 Figure 1 pictures the two pilots at KKMC FOL during a ground 
alert shift.  
                                                 
26 William L. Smallwood, Warthog: Flyting the A-10 in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Potomak 
Books Inc, 1993), 109. 
27 Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War, 195–197. 
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Figure 1. A-10s at KKMC FOL during Desert Storm28 
Following the end of the Desert Storm, there are some sporadic accounts of A-10s 
using FOLs in Operation Southern Watch but nothing that contributes to significant 
findings for this thesis topic. One key development was USAF A-10 maintainers stopped 
training to full integrated combat turnarounds in the mid-1990s. More importantly, 
maintenance technical order data changed and removed this as an approved option.29 To 
date, A-10s still conduct hot pit refueling (taking on fuel with the engines running) but can 
no longer be loaded with weapons or countermeasures with engines running.30 This 
limitation is one of the significant roadblocks to operationalize the full capacity of A-10 
austere capabilities.  
3. Operation Enduring Freedom
In March 2002, A-10s were the first fighter jets to operate from Bagram airfield. 
Gary Wetzel accounts for this in his book, A-10 Thunderbolt Units of Enduring Freedom 
2002–2007.31 Pilots describe the difficulty in operating off of the crumbling Soviet era 
runway, weaving around repairs and even utilizing the parallel taxiway for flight 
operations. Other fighter aircraft did not operate from Bagram until years later, after 
significant runway repairs were completed. Even as late as 2014, A-10s operated from 
28 Source: John Marks personal archive 
29 Anthony Roe, personal communication, November 20, 2018. 
30 Anthony Roe, personal communication, November 20, 2018. 
31 Gary Wetzel, A-10 Thunderbolt II Units of Operation Enduring Freedom 2002–2007 (Oxford: 
Osprey Publishing, 2013), 33–54. 
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Bagram’s parallel taxiway while the main runway was closed for repairs. Other fighter 
aircraft were moved to Kandahar Air Base while until the runway repairs were completed. 
4. A2/AD Environment
In November 2011, President Obama declared an “Asian Pivot” for U.S. defense 
strategy while addressing the Australian Parliament. The rise of Chinese influence in the 
region, coupled with their exploding economy and significant increase in defense spending 
caught the attention of the president and the Department of Defense (DOD). This inspired 
the next generation of research into untethered and dispersed operations. Fighting an air 
and sea battle against the People’s Republic of China presents a daunting task. Advanced 
Chinese ballistic missiles coupled with a robust surface-to-air and air-to-air threat 
manifested the term anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). Most U.S. MOBs in Korea, Guam, 
and Japan are within range of Chinese weapons. U.S. air defenses and ballistic missile 
defenses could be easily overwhelmed by the sheer number of Chinese weapons.32 
Lt Col Robert Davis wrote an informational piece for Air and Space Power Journal 
about “Rapid Raptor.” Rapid Raptor conceptually pairs a 4-ship of F-22s with a single C-
17 to deploy out of Alaska as a single package to fight in the Western Pacific. The C-17, 
carrying weapons, additional pilots, maintenance personnel, and fuel can sustain with 4-
ship of Raptors for two to three days of fighting prior to returning to Alaska or another 
MOB in the area of responsibility (AOR). The F-22/C-17 package can utilize up to 400 
potential runways in the first and second island chains off the east coast of China to conduct 
a full FARP and return to the fight.33 The concept minimizes duration on the ground, 
maintains unpredictability of FARP location, and limits static targets available to Chinese 
ballistic missiles and aircraft. The Rapid Raptor concept is one of the promising tactics to 
survive and conduct an air war an A2/AD environment.  
32 Jan Van Tol et al. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/airsea-
battle-concept. 
33 Robert Davis, “Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft: Power Projection in an 
AntiAccess Environgment.” Air & Space Power Journal 28, no 5 (September-October 2014): 5–28. 
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-28_Issue-5/F-Davis.pdf 
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The Asian Pivot combined with the Rapid Raptor construct inspired more literature 
on leveraging FARP and dispersed operations to counter the Chinese threat in the A2/AD 
environment.34 Maj Badowski and Maj Hutter wrote papers for the Air Command and Staff 
College analyzing the advantages/disadvantages of the Rapid Raptor concept and how best 
to conquer the logistical and command and control challenges of conducting dispersed 
operations at multiple locations simultaneously in the Western Pacific. Major Hutter 
promoted using sea-based platforms to alleviate strain on the mobility air force. Major 
Badowski encouraged using broad mission orders to overcome command and control 
challenges.35 
So where is the Air Force going in 2018 and beyond? Maj Gen Brown and 
colleagues wrote a senior-level perspective piece for ASPJ describing multiple scenarios 
utilizing dispersed and untethered operations to solve tactical problems and address 
strategic threats. Vignettes include a coalition effort using austere COBs in Eastern Europe 
to fight the Russians and a Rapid Raptor concept to fight the Chinese. More importantly 
they suggest using untethered operations to solve the tyranny of distance problem in Africa. 
This is one of the first pieces in the last five years to apply USAF FARP operations beyond 
the A2/AD near peer threat environment.36  
5. Current Literature 
The A-10 community is investigating austere FARP operations across a broader 
spectrum, not just a tool to operate inside of the A2/AD environment. The A-10 differs 
from the F-22 and other fighter jets in the sense it is not hand cuffed to smooth concrete 
runways; it can operate off dirt, asphalt, rough concrete, highways, or other suitable 
surfaces. The A-10 community wants to be closer to the fight, conduct face-to-face mission 
                                                 
34 “Asia Pivot” or “Pacific Pivot” refers to President Barak Obama shifting foreign policy focus to East 
Asia and away from Europe and Middle East. The Asian Pivot started circa 2011.  
35 Russel Badowski. Airpower Projection in the Anti-Access/Area Denial Environment: Dispersed 
Operations (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 2015); Ryan Hutter, Cutting the Cord: 
Sustaining Untethered Air Superiority Operations in the Pacific (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and 
Staff College, 2016). 
36
 Brown, Spacey, and Glover. “Unteathered Operations: Rapid Mobility and Forward Basing Are 
Keys to Airpower’s Success in the A2/AD Environment,” 24. 
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planning with the supported unit, rapidly reload to get back to the fight sooner, and fly in 
places not accessible or reachable by traditional means. There are a series of Air Force 
press releases about A-10s conducting austere training in Eastern Europe, the National 
Training Center at Ft Irwin, and dry lake beds in remote Nevada ranges.37 Figure 2 shows 
an A-10 conducting austere operations in the Nellis Test and Training Range (NTTR). The 
gap in literature is not one of these reports or stories is published in a credible defense 
journal. It is merely a conglomeration of local base press news articles covering local unit 
training. There has been a significant amount of FARP and austere operations testing and 
training, but it has not been finalized, or officially released through DOD channels. That is 
one of the goals of this thesis is to acquire, consolidate, summarize, and analyze this 
unpublished bank of work to highlight the testing and exercise progress and potential. 
Figure 2.  An A-10 performs a dry lake bed landing near Las Vegas, NV38 
 
                                                 
37 Ryan Brown, “A-10s make rare highway landing near Russian border,” CNN, June 27, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/politics/a10-warthog-highway-landing-russia-border-estonia/index.html; 
Mikaley Towle, “‘Thunder’ rolls at Fort Irwin.” Nellis Air Force Base Public Affairs, July 23, 2015. 
http://www.nellis.af.mil/News/Features/Article/665451/thunder-rolls-at-fort-irwin/; Joshua Kleinholz, 
“Weapons School gets down and dirty in degraded conditions exercise” Nellis Air Force Base Public 
Affairs, May 5, 2017, https://www.nellis.af.mil/News/Article/1174392/weapons-school-gets-down-and-
dirty-in-degraded-conditions-exercise/ 
38 Source: https://www.nellis.af.mil/News/Photos/igphoto/2001742739/ 
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II. LEVERAGING THE BENEFITS OF FARP 
Why should a Combatant Commander take additional risk by forward deploying 
airplanes? Joint Publication 3–09.3 Close Air Support suggests placing CAS airplanes and 
pilots at FOBs or FOLs near the operational area improves flexibility, responsiveness, and 
effectiveness of the CAS team.39 This chapter will discuss some of the major benefits of 
operating fixed wing aircraft from a FOL with a FARP available. The list of benefits is not 
all inclusive and not all benefits are realized on each mission or in every area of operations. 
FARP requirements and risks will be discussed in upcoming chapters. 
A. INTEGRATED MISSION PLANNING WITH FORWARD DEPLOYED 
TROOPS. 
Face-to-Face, integrated mission planning, briefing and rehearsal better prepares 
Close Air Support (CAS) aircrew to support Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) 
with fires closely integrated with the maneuver unit according to the supported 
commander’s requirements. Joint Publication 3–09.3 Close Air Support defines CAS as: 
Close air support (CAS) is air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft 
against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and 
requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement 
of those forces.40 
JP 9–09.3 goes on to say:  
 
[T]he preferred use of a CAS asset is to have it preplanned and prebriefed. 
Rehearsals provide participants an opportunity to walk through the scheme 
of maneuver; gain familiarity with terrain, airspace restrictions, and 
procedures; and identify shortfalls.41 
In order to leverage the benefits of integrated, face-to-face mission planning, the 
66th Weapons Squadron began deploying A-10s to Bicycle Lake, starting in 2014, from 
                                                 
39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Close Air Support, JP 3–09.3 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_09_3.pdf, I-8. 
40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Close Air Support, xi. 
41 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Close Air Support, I-7. 
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Nellis AFB, NV in support of brigade-level offensive and defensive decisive action 
exercises at the National Training Center at Ft Irwin, CA as part of an A-10 Weapons 
Officer upgrade syllabus. During these events, four A-10s fly to Bicycle Lake, a dirt strip 
within the NTC training complex, one day prior to the planned exercise. After securing 
their airplanes on the dirt field, the A-10 pilots spend a few hours at the Brigade Main 
Command Post developing the next day’s fire and maneuver plan and participating in 
Combined Arms Rehearsals (CARs).42 Figures 3 and 4 show A-10s conducting operation 
from Bicycle Lake. 
Figure 3.  A-10 departs FOL location at Ft Irwin, CA.43 
 
“Airmen assigned to the 22nd Special Tactics Squadron, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 
WA, look on as an A-10 Thunderbolt II departs from the National Training Center at Fort 
Irwin, CA, July 16, 2015. An austere field landing allows for the A-10 pilots to push in, 
refuel, and provide support in a heavily-contested environment.” 
  
                                                 
42 Aaron Brady “66 WPS FAC(A) Sylabus Events” (presentation, 66 WPS, Nellis AFB, NV, June 14, 
2017) 
43 Source: Image and associated caption: 
https://www.nellis.af.mil/News/Features/Article/665451/thunder-rolls-at-fort-irwin/ 
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Figure 4.  A-10 at Fort Irwin, CA44 
 
The pilot of this A-10 slung a hammock between the weapons pylons of the A-10 for a 
place to spend the night between mission planning and taking off the next morning to 
support the exercise. 
The next day, the A-10 pilots take off from Bicycle Lake to provide CAS and 
Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)) support of the brigade decisive action 
exercise. According to the 549th Combat Training Squadron Director of Operations, 
brigade commanders continue to give rave reviews for the performance of the forward 
deployed pilots. Four years of feedback show an increased success rate in main battle 
exercises with forward deployed aircrew compared to exercises where the pilots remain at 
Nellis AFB. Forward deployed pilots cited a higher level of situational awareness and 
ground units cited a higher confidence level in assigned CAS aircraft and aircrew as 
reasons for increased success.45 According to Captain Gonsalves, one of the forward 
deployed pilots pictured in Figure 5: 
                                                 
44 Source: 66 WPS Archives 
45 Jason Feuring, “Green Flag West After-Action Brief” (presentation, 66 WPS, Nellis AFB, NV June 
1, 2016) 
18 
I don’t think there is a better medium of communication than meeting face-
to-face and seeing the actual battlespace and area that they’re operating in. 
It gives us a chance to visualize what their conditions are like, see what 
they’re dealing with, and understand their limiting factors. This helps 
strengthen the relationship. When you’re fighting a fight, relationships are 
what it’s all about46 
Figure 5. Pilots at the Brigade tactical operations center (TOC), Ft Irwin47 
“U.S. Air Force Capt. Erik Gonsalves, 75th Fighter Squadron A-10 Thunderbolt II 
instructor pilot, meets with U.S. Army service members in support of Green Flag West 
15–08.5 on the National Training Center range at Fort Irwin, Calif., July 16, 2015. This 
was the first time Air Force pilots met face-to-face with the U.S. Army troops on the 
ground to discuss tactics that were going to be employed during this Green Flag West 
exercise.” 
The current Air Force trend of operating from main MOBs does not allow for face-
to-face mission planning for conventional CAS pilots and often leads to pilots with low 
situational awareness attempting to support a ground unit with a complicated scheme of 
maneuver. Under the standard Air Force 72-hour ATO construct, pilots rarely get an 
opportunity to brief face-to-face or even telephonically with the supported unit. Typically, 
the Ground Liaison Officer (GLO), an Army representative attached to the aviation unit, 
will contact the supported unit’s JTAC or Fires Support Officer (FSO) the night prior to 
the mission while the pilots are asleep. After the pilots report to work, they receive a 15-
minute brief from the GLO on their assigned mission of the day. Missions and supported 
46 Towle. 2015. “‘Thunder’ rolls at Fort Irwin.” 
47 Source: Image and associated caption. 
https://www.nellis.af.mil/News/Features/Article/665451/thunder-rolls-at-fort-irwin/ 
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units vary greatly day-to-day and offer a pilot little continuity with a particular region or 
unit.48 
Other times, airplanes are put in XCAS (airborne alert CAS) orbits. In these 
operations, pilots are not assigned to a specific mission but are assigned to a specific place 
to hold to allow for a dynamic reroll if a unit requires CAS during mission execution. Pilots 
are rerolled to support units after ground units make an immediate request for CAS, 
typically as a result of Troops in Contact (TIC). Pilots are rerolled by the Air Support 
Operations Center (ASOC) often with little more information than a location, frequency, 
and call sign of the JTAC supporting the ground unit. After the pilot makes radio contact 
with the ground unit, he or she receives a situation update IAW JP 3–09.3.49 Table 1, from 
JP 3-09.3 lists the elements of a situation update. 
Table 1.   Close air support situation update50 
 
 
                                                 
48 Pat Parrish “451 AEW Tactical Lessons Learned” (presentation, 75 EFS, Bagram Air Base, 
Afghanistan, March 1, 2015) 
49 Parrish “451 AEW Tactical Lessons Learned”; Note: CAS procedures and the command and control 
architecture are described in detail in JP 3–09.3 Close Air Support. 
50 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Close Air Support, V-18. 
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While the situation update attempts to build a pilot’s awareness and understanding 
of the ground situation, it is often insufficient compared to face-to-face mission planning 
with a supported unit. More often, situation updates passed over the radio, usually passed 
under duress, are abbreviated, rushed, and generic, offering a pilot little chance to build his 
situational awareness before CAS fires are required. Operating from a FOL allows face-to-
face mission planning on a more regular basis giving pilots a higher level of situational 
awareness and ground units a higher level of confidence in their assigned CAS aircrew.  
B. REDUCE DEMAND AND RISK TO TANKER FORCE 
1. Demand 
Currently the USAF has 457 tanker aircraft capable of refueling fixed wing USAF 
jets.51 Tanker aircraft are in high demand stateside and overseas. In 2015, USAF tankers 
flew over 20,000 sorties and conducted 110,000 aerial refuelings delivering 1.1 billion 
pounds of fuel in support of OIR and OEF.52 In a deployed environment, oftentimes, every 
gallon of tanker gas is spoken for. A single B-1 CAS mission flown to Afghanistan from 
Al Udeid airbase departs with 180,000 pounds of fuel and can require two tankers 
offloading in excess of 200,000 pounds of fuel to support one mission.53 Any tanker fall-
out can jeopardize the mission or drastically limit on-station time. Positioning aircraft at 
FOLs, utilizing fuel from cargo aircraft, fuel trucks, prepositioned fuel bladders, or fuel 
tanks can greatly reduce the strain and high demand for tankers. 
                                                 
51 Air Force Association, “2018 USAF Almanac” Air Force Magazine 100 no. 6 (June 2018) 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2018/June%202018/Air%20Forc
e%20Magazine%202018%20USAF%20Almanac.pdf, 48. Note: 457 is the number of KC-135 and KC-10s 
in the USAF inventory as of 30 Sep 17. This number is higher than the amount of operational aircraft as 
many are assigned to training units. USAF fighter jets can only accept boom type refueling. Navy and 
Marine jets utilize drogue chute refueling. 
52 USAF Central Command Combined Air Operations Center, “CFACC 2012–2017 Airpower 
Statistics.” June 30, 2017, 
http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Airpower%20Summary%20-
%20June%202017.pdf?ver=2017-07-10-040401-420. 




Future operating areas will likely pose a significant risk for the tanker force. Long-
range radar surface-to-air systems and even short-range man-portable air defense system 
(MANPADS) pose a significant risk to tanker aircraft. USAF tanker aircraft, all of which 
were adapted from civilian airliner airframes, lack the maneuverability and defensive 
systems needed to operate within ranges of surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs). The 
only option is for tankers to orbit outside the ranges of these missiles called the missile 
engagement zone (MEZ). During the 2011 Libya air campaign, tankers occupied refueling 
tracks over the Mediterranean Sea, hundreds of miles from the operations area, to avoid 
Libya’s antiquated air defense systems. Distant tanker orbits significantly reduced the on-
station time of fighter and bomber aircraft.54 Future air campaigns against peer or near-peer 
enemies will push tankers further and further from the operations area. Utilizing ground 
based refueling locations may be necessary to conduct refueling closer to the operational 
area. 
C. FLEXIBLE DEPLOYMENT TIMELINES AND PERSISTENT CAS FAR 
FROM MOBS 
Air campaigns often require a MOB or Naval Carrier Group close to the AOR to 
sustain air operations. Constructing or securing a MOB capable of supporting sustained 
fighter or bomber operations takes a significant amount of time, resources, and security. 
Utilizing a FOL concept can greatly decrease the deployment timeline and host base 
requirements. A FOL can also enable persistent FW operations in “tyranny of distance” 
scenarios. 
1. Enabling Rapid Deployment Timelines: A-10s in Operation Anaconda 
A-10s forward deployed from Al Jaber Kuwait to Jacobabad, Pakistan on one day’s 
notice to support Operation Anaconda.55 A-10s operated for ten days from Pakistan with a 
                                                 
54 Matt Orlovsky,” Flying in Operation Odyssey Dawn” (presentation, 66 WPS, Nellis AFB, NV, June 
14, 2015) 
55 Wetzel, A-10 Thunderbolt II Units of Operation Enduring Freedom 2002–07, 10–32. 
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minimal footprint and host base support.56 Jacobabad shortened the enroute commute to 
one hour per direction compared to five hours each way from Al Jaber. During Anaconda, 
the U.S. did not operate any MOBs or FOL inside Afghanistan capable of supporting FW 
aircraft. A-10s were not part of the original plan for Operation Anaconda, they were rapidly 
mobilized while supporting Operation Southern Watch after Americans started to take 
significant casualties during the mission and more CAS was requested.57 The two pilots, 
Scott “Soup” Campbell and Eddie “K-9” Kostelnik, each received a distinguished flying 
cross for their efforts in supporting the complicated mission. They expertly provided lethal 
fires and crucial stack management, fires integration, and deconfliction as FAC(A)s. The 
two pilots were credited with killing over 200 enemy fighters on a single mission.58 
Two weeks after Anaconda ended, A-10s were moved to Bagram Air Base, 
Afghanistan and operated off of Bagram’s crumbling Soviet constructed runway. A-10s 
were also the first coalition aircraft to base inside Iraq in 2003. A-10s landed at Tulil, Iraq, 
April 4, 2003, 14 days after the start of combat operations.59 In both of these examples, A-
10s were able to project forward from MOBs with a minimal footprint to be closer to the 
fight and supported units. According to the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
(MCWP) 3–32-1 Close Air Support “to facilitate the integration necessary for effective 
CAS, aircraft are normally based as close as possible to supported units”60 These moves 
enabled A-10s to provide crucial close air support early in each conflict before MOBs were 
established. 
2. Africa and the “Tyranny of Distance” 
The October 2017 attack on Army Special Forces troops in Niger, resulting in four 
American fatalities, highlighted that U.S. troops are being deployed to all corners of the 
                                                 
56 Edward Kostelnik, personal communication, November 26, 2018. 
57 Wetzel, A-10 Thunderbolt II Units of Operation Enduring Freedom 2002–07, 10–32. 
58 Rebecca Grant “The Airpower of Anaconda.” Air Force Magazine, September, 2002. 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2002/September%202002/0902anaconda.aspx 
59Air Force Historical Support Division, “2003—Operation Iraqi Freedom.” USAF History, June 13, 
2013, https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458942/operation-iraqi-freedom/. 
60 Department of the Navy. Close Air Support, MCWP 3–23.1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 
1998). 
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globe to combat terrorism. As efforts in Africa increase to dismantle terrorist groups like 
the Islamic State or Boko Haram, U.S. troops are extending further and further from 
available U.S. close air support and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) support. In the Niger tragedy, at least 50 plus armed militants were 
able to assemble and stage a well-organized attack against U.S. and Nigerian forces.61 In 
the end, four Americans and five Nigerians were killed.62 U.S. Forces required emergency 
CAS and casualty evacuation support (CASEVAC) from French aircraft launched from 
Mali.63 French fighter aircraft arrived two hours after the ambush commenced, provided a 
non-lethal show-of-force and departed.64 
The continent of Africa, three times larger than the United States, poses a 
significant “tyranny of distance” problem for the U.S. military. The attack on the U.S. 
soldiers in Tongo Tongo, Niger was over 2350 nautical miles away from Camp Lemonnier, 
Djibouti. Camp Lemonnier is the only MOB with a permanent American presence on the 
African continent.65 Other European bases such as Rota Naval Air Station, Spain or 
Sigonella Naval Air station are closer, but still over 1400NM away.  
These vast distances are difficult to comprehend. Djibouti, 2350NM from Tongo 
Tongo, is the equivalent distance between Bangor, ME, and Los Angeles, CA. Rota Naval 
Air Station, Spain is the closest permanent U.S. facility capable of supporting fighter or 
bomber aircraft, yet it still is over 1400NM away. This distance is the roughly the 
equivalent distance between Chicago, IL, and Los Angeles, CA. Land-locked countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa are often inaccessible to amphibious based airplanes as well. Figure 6 
shows the vast distances in Africa compared to the United States. 
                                                 
61 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Soldiers Were Separated from Unit in Niger Ambush, Officials Say,” New York 
Times October 26, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/africa/niger-soldiers-killed-
ambush.html. 
62 Schmitt, “U.S. Soldiers Were Separated from Unit in Niger Ambush, Officials Say” 
63 Schmitt, “U.S. Soldiers Were Separated from Unit in Niger Ambush, Officials Say” 
64 Schmitt, “U.S. Soldiers Were Separated from Unit in Niger Ambush, Officials Say” 
65 John Vadiver, “Staging sites enable AFRICOM to reach hot spots ‘within 4 hours’ leader says.” 
Stars and Stripes, May 8, 2015, https://www.stripes.com/news/africa/staging-sites-enable-africom-to-reach-
hot-spots-within-4-hours-leader-says-1.345120. 
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Figure 6.  Africa / United States comparison 
 
To help visualize the vast distances forces must traverse in Africa, these two maps are set 
to equal scales. Side-by-side it is easier to compare the distances between Tongo Tongo 
Niger, Camp Lemonnier (2350NM) Rota NAS (1400NM) and Sigonella NAS (1400NM) 
with similar distances in the U.S. In the U.S., Bangor, ME to Los Angeles, CA (2300NM) 
and Chicago, IL to Los Angeles, CA (1400NM) represent similar distances. 
Utilizing a “Lily-Pad” strategy to leverage existing cooperative security locations 
(CSL), Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and contingency locations on the African continent, 
A-10 and other fixed wing aircraft capable of austere operations can extend the reach of air 
assets.66 This can help eliminate reliance on tanker support, enable persistence CAS 
operations, and limit excessively long combat sorties and pilot fatigue. According to 
AFRICOM there are 46 locations available contingency use on the African continent.67 
The specific locations and capabilities of these locations is beyond the classification of this 
paper.  
                                                 
66 Cooperative Security Location (CSL) – “A facility located outside the United States and US 
territories with little or no permanent US presence, maintained with periodic Service, contractor, or host-
nation support. Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistic support, and rotational 
use by operating forces and are a focal point for security cooperation activities.” Source: JP 1-02 
A warm base is a facility with a small permanent presence of U.S. support personnel and is capable of 
supporting operations with rotational units. It may contain prepositioned equipment or POL. Also known as 
a forward operating site (FOS) 
A cold base is similar to warm base without a permanent presence of support personnel when the 
facility is not in use. 
67 David Vine, “The Lily-Pad Strategy: How the Pentagon is Quietly Transforming Its Overseas Base 
Empire,” Huffington Post, December 6, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-vine/us-military-
bases_b_1676006.html. 
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D. REDUCES RISK OR EFFECT OF MOB ATTACK. 
Main operating bases provide a lucrative, high-payoff target for the enemy. 
Inflicting damage to a few aircraft or damaging a runway can significantly affect U.S. air 
operations. Whether it is a group of insiders wearing U.S. uniforms, a commercially 
purchased drone with a small chemical weapon attached to it, or high-tech surface-to-
surface (S/S) missile, static MOBs are vulnerable to attack. Dispersing aircraft, basing in 
unpredictable locations, or quickly relocating after a base attack can reduce the likelihood 
and effects of an enemy attack on an airfield.  
1. Effects of MOB Attack 
On September 14, 2012, 15 Taliban insurgents dressed in U.S. uniforms launched 
an attack on Camp Bastion, a MOB in Helmand Province, destroying six Marine AV-8s 
and damaging two others. The attack destroyed or damaged 80% of fixed wing (FW) CAS 
airplanes at Camp Bastion and killed the VFA-211 commanding officer.68 The successful 
attack temporarily eliminated U.S. Marine Corps’ ability to provide close air support in the 
Helmand province.69 Reports of the well-rehearsed attack, suggest the 15 Taliban attackers 
had ample time to prepare for the assault and attacking fixed wing aircraft was the main 
objective. The aircraft, located in close proximity to each other, on one ramp, at a single 
airfield provided an easy, high-payoff target for the attackers. 
2. WPTO and Eastern Europe: Dispersing Assets to Decrease 
Targetable Signature 
In the West Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO), nearly every coalition base in 
Pacific Command (PACOM) is within range of Chinese S/S missiles.70 Figure 7 illustrates 
Chinese S/S missile rages compared to U.S. bases in the region. A Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Analysis (CSBA) report suggests active U.S. missile defenses at MOBs would 
                                                 
68 John D. Gresham, “Attack on Camp Bastion: The Destruction of VMA-211,” Defense Media 
Network. September 20, 2012, https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/attack-on-camp-bastion-the-
destruction-of-vma-211. 
69 Gresham, “Attack on Camp Bastion: The Destruction of VMA-211” 
70 Van Tol et al. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, 18. 
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become overwhelmed by Chinese attack leading to significant MOB damage or complete 
destruction.71 The CSBA lists base diversification as a strategy to limit the ability and 
effectiveness of the Chinese to attack airplanes with S/S missiles.72 
Figure 7.  Chinese S/S missiles compared to U.S. bases in the region.73 
 
 
Lt Col Robert Davis, promoting F-22 FARP operations in the WPTO, cites 258 
runways that potentially meet length and materiel requirements to support fighter 
operations in the 1st and 2nd island chains.74 Figure 8 illustrates the 1st and 2nd island 
chains of the WTPO. The 258 potential airfields found by Lt Col Davis does not include 
potential highway surfaces. See Lt Col Benjamin Hatch’s Air War College Paper for 
                                                 
71 Van Tol et al. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, 36 
72 Van Tol et al. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, 39 
73 Source: Van Tol et al. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, 18 
74 Davis, “Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft” 15 
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analysis on the potential use of roadways in the WPTO.75 Dispersing aircraft to FOLs 
combined with efforts to limit an enemy’s ability to collect real time Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) can reduce the likelihood of a successful S/S 
missile attack. 
Figure 8.  WPTO first and second island chains76 
 
Rapid Raptor looks to utilize distributed basing in the 1st and 2nd island chains to operate 
F-22s close to mainland China. Four F-22s, supported by a C-17 loaded with 
maintenance equipment, personnel, and weapons can fight two to three days away from a 
MOB.77 
The CSBA report only focused on the WPTO. A similar, and potentially more 
difficult A2/AD environment exists in the Balkans. Russian S/S missiles S/A missiles 
located in Kaliningrad, Crimea, and Russia can target most bases on the European continent 
                                                 
75 Benjamin B. Hatch, Optimizing Dispersed Air Operations: A Concept to use Highways as 
Improvised Airfields in a Contested Environment (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 
2015). 
76 Source: Van Tol et al. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, 13 
77 Davis, “Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft”  
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and airplanes flying east of Berlin.78 Figure 9 shows potential Russian S/S and S/A missile 
locations. Redundant, hardened, mobile, and layered air defense systems make them 
extremely difficult to target or neutralize with kinetic or nonkinetic weapons.  
Figure 9.  Potential locations of Russian S/S and S/A missiles 
 
Red triangles represent potential Russian A/S and S/S missile sites. S/A missile systems 
in Kaliningrad can target large aircraft operating east of Berlin and target most aircraft 
operating in the Baltic States. The layered air defense system presents a significant threat 
to air operations. 
During the Cold War, NATO countries planned to use an extensive network of 
contingency bases to employ airpower against the Soviets. Figure 10 shows an A-10 lading 
on a strip of autobahn in the 1980s. Any future conflict with Russia will likely require the 
same strategy to increase the survivability and decrease vulnerability of NATO airplanes 
from Russian attack. Sections of Autobahn, abandoned Cold War airstrips, and host-nation 
airfields in eastern Europe provide options for base diversification options in Europe. U.S. 
and NATO forces continue to exercise adaptive basing concepts to provide force projection 
in Eastern Europe. Figure 11 shows an A-10 conducting training from a highway strip in 
Estonia in 2017. In 2018, the USAF began funding DABS (deployable airbase system). 
                                                 
78 S300V4 can target airplanes out to and unclassified range of 400km. Based on these unclassified 
ranges, aircraft could be targeted soon after passing east of berlin. Large airplanes with limited 
maneuverability such as tankers, AWACS, and JSTARs, are most susceptible to be targeted at maximum 
ranges 
 29 
DABS, known as a “base in a box,” contains all equipment required to set up a sustain 
airfield operations.79 The rapidly deployable DABS will be staged at strategic places 
around the European continent and leverage the $4 billion plus in recent airfield and 
infrastructure upgrades as part of the European Deterrence Initiative.80 
Figure 10.  An A-10 executes an Autobahn landing in the early 1980s81 
 
Sections of the German autobahn were specifically constructed to be used as emergency 
air strips. Cold War OPLANs called for utilizing these emergency strips to extend the 
range and of European based fighters, absorb the influx of CONUS based fighters, and 
disperse assets to reduce vulnerability to Soviet air attack. 
  
                                                 
79 Valarie Insinna, “US Air Force tests ‘base in a box’ in Poland to prep for future wars.” Defense 
News, August 26, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/08/27/us-air-force-tests-base-in-a-box-in-
poland-to-prep-for-future-wars/. 
80 Defense News Video “What’s the U.S. Air Force upgrading in Europe?” Defense News 
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/08/27/us-air-force-tests-base-in-a-box-in-poland-to-prep-for-
future-wars/; Pat Towell and Aras D. Kazlauskas, The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary 
Overview, CRS Report No. IF10946 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10946.pdf. 
81 Source : https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/motoring/the-highways-masquerading-as-
secret-military-airfields/news-story/adccbeb1ed6ab0d4ce20ac92bce72d20 
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Figure 11.  An A-10 takes off from a highway in Estonia in 201782 
 
NATO aircraft frequently practice operating from highways and abandoned runways in 
the Baltic States. Sophisticated Russian Surface-to-Air missile systems could preclude 
airborne refueling near the area of operations necessitating FARP operations to sustain air 
operations.  
3. Korea: Maintaining Sortie Generation Rates if a MOB becomes 
Unusable 
The U.S. Air Force maintains two MOBs on the Korean Peninsula, Osan AB near 
Seoul and Kunsan AB on the western coast.83 These MOBs will likely be priority military 
targets for North Korea. Osan AB, in particular, presents a difficult force protection 
problem in the event of hostilities with North Korea. Osan is within range of Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) long range artillery and SCUD missile systems.84 
Urban surroundings around Osan Air Base offer potential attackers concealment close to 
the base. Local workers with access to the base present a credible insider threat.  
                                                 
82 Source: https://www.businessinsider.com/air-force-a-10s-practice-takeoff-and-landings-on-a-
highway-in-estonia-2017-8 
83 “PACAF Units,” Pacific Air Forces, accessed October 15, 2018, www.pacaf.af.mil.  
84 Michael Mazarr et al., The Korean Peninsula: Three Dangerous Scenarios (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE262.html. 
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DPRK likely possesses mass amounts of chemical weapons (CW) to include blister 
and nerve agents.85 Even small amounts of CW delivered on an airbase could severely limit 
sortie production rates even without causing casualties. The 51st Fighter Wing at Osan 
routinely conducts exercises under the threat of a chemical or biological attack conducing 
operations in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) gear. Even with frequent 
rehearsals, conducting operations in restrictive MOPP gear is cumbersome and can 
severely limit sortie production rates, pilot capability, and sortie effectiveness.86 
Maintaining the capability to quickly move air operations to alternate sites on the 
Korean peninsula can help mitigate the effects of a Chemical/Biological Weapon (CBW) 
attack on a MOB like Osan AB. Quickly relocating to an alternate site can reduce the 
likelihood of turning jets in full MOPP gear. Conducting full integrated combat 
turnarounds (ICTs) at an alternate site is a viable option to maintain sortie generation rates 
and reduce aircraft turn-around time. 
E. FACILITATES RAPID WEAPONS RELOADING 
1. OEF versus OIR 
Sixteen years of “safe” air operations if Afghanistan have led the DOD to mostly 
forget valuable lessons on aircraft and weapons scarcity. At the height of the Afghanistan 
war in 2011, over 100,000 U.S. troops were deployed all throughout the country. A 
continuous rotation of two USAF fighter squadrons, one Marine squadron, multiple 
squadrons from NATO partners, a carrier air wing, bombers flying from the Persian Gulf, 
and a continuous presence of AFSOC AC-130s flooded skies of Afghanistan. For aircraft 
stationed in country (Kandahar, Bagram, or Camp Bastion) rarely did missions extend  
 
 
                                                 
85 Nuclear Threat Initiative, DPRK Chemical Weapons, updated April 2018. 
https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/chemical/. 
86 Eli Cullpepper “Fighting on the ‘Pen’” (presentation, 66WPS, Nellis AFB, NV, December 15, 2016) 
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beyond 150 NM from home base. A constant presence of tanker aircraft, often within 
50 NM of the area of operations, kept fighters airborne for the typical four to five-hour 
fighter aircraft combat mission. Low weapons employment rates meant a flight of aircraft 
rarely went “Winchester.”87 If weapons or fuel state became low, multiple flights of aircraft 
were available to relieve in place (RIP) if the ground situation required follow on CAS.88 
The application of airpower in future conflicts will likely not resemble the limited 
employment rates accustom to Afghanistan. At the height of the air campaign against ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria, weapons employment rates vastly exceeded those in Afghanistan. In 
August 2017, coalition aircraft conducted nearly 1500 airstrikes dropping over 5000 
weapons in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in one month alone.89 In comparison, the 
most kinetic months at the height of the OEF air campaign tallied less than 600 weapons 
dropped.90 Figures 12 and 13 compare sortie numbers and quantity of weapons released 
between OEF and OIR. According to Air Force Central Command data, approximately 








                                                 
87 Winchester is a brevity term meaning an aircraft is out of ordnance. Reference JP 1-02. 
88 Parrish,”451 AEW Tactical Lessons Learned.” 
89 USAF Central Command Combined Air Operations Center, “CFACC 2012–2017 Airpower 
Statistics.” 
90 Stephen Losey, “Afghanistan airstrikes hit highest point in years.” Air Force Times. October 9, 
2017. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2017/10/09/afghanistan-airstrikes-hit-highest-
point-in-years/. 
91 USAF Central Command Combined Air Operations Center, “CFACC 2012–2017 Airpower 
Statistics.” 
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Figure 12.  Sorties/airstrikes supporting OEF92 
 
AFCENT data showing number total number of CAS sorties, CAS sorties that released weapons, and 
number of weapons released 2012–2017 in support of OEF. Most years, less than 10% or CAS sorties 
released weapons. During the busiest year (2012) only 1,975 CAS sorties release weapons out of a 
staggering 28,760 CAS sorties flown. 
Figure 13.  CAS sorties/airstrikes supporting OIR93 
 
AFCENT data showing number total number of CAS sorties, CAS sorties that released weapons, and 
number of weapons released 2012–2017 in support of OIR. In 2016, 54% of CAS sorties employed 
weapons totaling over 30,000 weapons.  
Stationed out of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey supporting OIR, A-10s, carrying two 
times the payload of A-10s operating in Afghanistan, occasionally dropped all of their 
munitions. More frequently A-10s, would run out of a specific weapon needed to meet 
ground commander’s intent.94 Figure 14 shows a typical A-10 weapons loadout for OIR. 
Like Afghanistan, if an OIR CAS mission ran low on weapons or lacked a specific weapon 
                                                 
92 Source: USAF Central Command Combined Air Operations Center, “CFACC 2012–2017 Airpower 
Statistics.” 
93 Source: USAF Central Command Combined Air Operations Center, “CFACC 2012–2017 Airpower 
Statistics.” 
94 Christopher Pezzini, “74 EFS Operations in Syria” (presentation, 66 WPS, Nellis AFB, NV, June 
14, 2018).  
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to meet ground commander’s intent, another flight could be diverted to support. The high 
sortie numbers supporting OIR combined with a limited ground campaign meant multiple 
flights were typically available to fill an air request or RIP a flight low on weapons or fuel. 
The 74 FS weapons officer stated that during a six-month deployment a flight of A-10s 
never had to return to base (RTB) to retrieve a new airplane due to a low weapons state. If 
a flight did have to depart from Raqqah to Incirlik it would have taken approximately three 
hours to return with new airplane.95 Theoretically, this could have been cut down to one to 
one-and-a-half hours if a FARP was established at a potential FARP location in Turkey, 
75 NM from Raqqah.96 
Figure 14.  A-10 over Syria with nearly full complement of weapons97 
 
This picture shows the SCL of an A-10 supporting OIR in 2016. It is missing two 500lb 
bombs. Despite being loaded with six bombs, one A/G missile, seven rockets, and 1150 
30mm rounds, flights of A-10s frequently returned to base nearly out of weapons during 
the heavy air campaign periods of OIR. 
  
                                                 
95 Time calculated based on 250 NM flight path each way and 50 min on ground to swap airplanes. 
96 Potential FARP location is Sanliurfa Airport Turkey ICAO: LTCH. (7100’ RWY) 75NM from 
Raqqah. Includes 30 min ground time for FARP 
97 Source: www.af.mil. Note: Picture taken from Tanker after refueling the A-10. The A-10 had 
already expended 1xGPS guided munition. 
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2. Desert Storm FOLs 
During Desert Storm in 1991, A-10s utilized Al-Jouf and King Khalid Military City 
FOLs to increase station time and decrease off-station time when more weapons were 
required. Figure 15 shows the location of FOLs utilized by A-10s during the Gulf War. 
Pilots often returned to a FOL and FARPed two to three times per day while battling Iraqi 
forces or executing SCUD hunting missions in western Iraq.98 A 2-ship of A-10s piloted 
by Capt. Eric Salomonson and Lt. John Marks, reloaded weapons at KKMC two times on 
their infamous sortie that destroyed 23 Iraqi tanks and damaged up to 10 more tanks on a 
single mission.99 The key to their success was reloading AGM-65 missiles, which have one 
of the highest probability of kills (Pk) against armor of any aircraft munition in the DOD 
inventory.100 Figure 1 shows Lt Marks standing next to an A-10 loaded with two AGM-65 
Ds. Without the ability to FARP at a FOL, the flight would have been Winchester after 
destroying only eight tanks. Returning to the MOB for a new jet would have taken several 
hours. Weather and other operational requirements negated the availability of replacement 
fighters during Capt. Salomonson and Lt. Marks’ sortie.101 
Marks also described how FARPing during a mission offered tremendous 
flexibility to tailor an aircraft loadout to an evolving mission, environmental conditions, or 
anticipated target set. He described a FARP as a “Burger King drive-thru” of weapons; a 
pilot could pull into the FARP, request a specific assortment of weapons, and 20 minutes 
later his jet would be loaded and ready with his requested weapons.102 As an example, a 
pilot could elect to reload a jet with all infrared (IR) maverick variants instead of electro-
optical (EO) variants if they provided better target contrast on that specific day. Typically, 
jets were loaded with a mix of both. Or pilots could elect to not load free fall munitions to 
reduce weight and increase performance if the target set did not require bombs.103  
                                                 
98 Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War, 195–197. 
99 Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War, 195–197. 
100 Actual Pk data classified 
101 Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War, 195–197. 
102 John Marks, personal communication, November 25, 2018. 
103 John Marks, personal communication, November 25, 2018. 
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Figure 15.  A-10 FOLs used in Gulf War.104 
 
A-10’s utilized Al-Jouf and KKMC FOLs to service targets in central and western Iraq. 
Returning to KFIA was often too far, too time consuming, and required support from 
scarce tankers. 
F. INCREASES ON-STATION TIME  
In the absence of tanker support, basing closer the area of operations means a longer 
on-station time before an aircraft has to depart due to a low fuel state. Reference Figure 16 
for an example of available A-10 on-station time compared to distance from target. In the 
campaign to expel ISIS from Raqqah, A-10s would have around 0+30 hours of playtime if 
flying from Incirlik without tanker support compared to 1+20 hours if moved to a FOL 
near Sanliurfa, Turkey, 75NMs north of Raqqah. 
                                                 
104 Source: Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War, 2. 
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Figure 16.  A-10 time on target available.105 
 
 
G. PREPOSITION ASSETS CLOSE TO EXPECTED FIGHT 
1. Forward Basing for a Quick Reaction Force 
What if the Osama Bin Laden raid on his Abbottabad compound happened in 
December 2001 instead of May 2011? How could the U.S. provide a quick reaction force 
to the Navy SEALs, if the assault force experienced a significant firefight? In December 
2001, around the timeframe of the battle of Tora Bora, the U.S. did not have any permanent 
MOBs established in Afghanistan, it relied heavily on long range bombers flown from 
outside the country. If the U.S. stacked up aircraft along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, 
it could have likely tipped-off the Pakistanis that a U.S. led operation was going on inside 
their borders. However, if the U.S. had forward deployed A-10s to Bagram AB, kept them 
on 5-minute ground alert, it could have provided a flexible, timely QRF without 
telegraphing U.S. intentions.106 Figure 17 shows the relative position of Bagram AB 
compared to Abbottabad. 
 
 
                                                 
105 Source: Ryan E. Haden, A-10 FARP OPERATIONS Forward Arming and Refueling Point. (student 
paper, USAF Weapons School, 2004), 2. 
106 There are different levels of alert readiness. See Table 3. five-minute alert means aircraft are 
waiting at the end of the runway ready for takeoff. As mentioned earlier, A-10s were not based at Bagram 
until Apr 2002 following Operation Anaconda. 
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Figure 17.  Bagram to Abbottabad map 
 
The distance from Bagram to Abbottabad is 200 NM. If on five-minute ground alert, A-
10s could be overhead Abbottabad in 40 minutes with 40–60 minutes of on station time 
without tanker support. Reaction times from aircraft based outside of Afghanistan would 
be several hours. 
2. Forward basing for combat search and rescue 
The A-10 FOL concept can also be used to provide Combat Search and Rescue 
(CSAR) coverage for long range strike missions. Taking Operation El Dorado Canyon for 
example, the U.S. could have deployed A-10s to a FOL in Sicily, Crete, or even the Tunisia 
to provide CSAR coverage for the long-range mission launched from U.S. bases in England 
against targets in Libya. One F-111 was shot down during the 1986 bombing raid, and the 
crew was lost. The Navy 6th Fleet was charged with providing SAR coverage for the 
mission. The Navy dedicated SAR helicopters to the mission but lacked FW pilots qualified 
as Sandy 1.107 Forward deploying AF CSAR assets will become more crucial if long range 
strike missions are conducted in land-locked areas of the world. 
 
                                                 
107 Note: Sandy 1 is the callsign of a specifically trained Rescue Mission Commander (RMC). RMCs 
are designated to control recovery efforts in the objective area and coordinate all recovery mission 
requirements. For more info on RMC responsibilities reference JP 3–50 Personnel Recovery. 
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Figure 18.  Operation El Dorado Canyon flight path108 
 
Due to country overflight restrictions, F-111 aircraft were forced to fly around the western flank of 
Europe to conduct and air raid in Libya. One F-111 was lost due to enemy fire and the crew perished. 
Forward staging dedicated AF CSAR assets to Sicily or Tunisia could have increased the probability 
of a successful rescue. Forward staging CSAR assets for future strike missions in land-locked 
countries could be even more critical. 
H. ALLOWS FOR A FLEXIBLE MISSION TIMELINE WHILE 
MAINTAINING POTENTIAL ON-STATION TIME. 
The dynamic nature and fluid timeline of special operations missions makes it 
difficult to match aircraft on-station time and available coverage when air missions are 
launched from hundreds of miles away. Trigger-based or event-based SOF missions are 
particularly difficult to cover. Due to long transit time, often airplanes need to launch 
before a mission is a go or a trigger is met. If an aircraft cannot maintain coverage for the 
entire mission, typically coverage is prioritized for the most dangerous portions of the 
                                                 
108 Source: Screen shot taken from video: “Operation El Dorado Canyon 1986 Libya” 7:45, posted by 
jaglavaksoldier, September 6, 2008, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgqDT2mlENo. 
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mission (e.g. infil, actions on, exfil). Any slip in a planned timeline, once an aircraft is 
airborne, may limit or eliminate an aircraft’s ability to cover key mission events. 
Keeping assets on various levels of ground alert before or during the mission allows 
for timeline flexibility without significantly sacrificing on station time. It is common for 
Army rotary wing assets to maintain a ground alert posture (Level 1, 2, 3.) during SOF 
missions. Most commonly, the conventional Air Force exercises ground alert status for 
standby CSAR operations. The key to ground alert operations is the launch and transit time 
must be fast enough to meet mission requirements. Maintaining ground alert from a distant 
MOB will typically not meet SOF mission requirements. Keeping FW assets on ground 
alert at a FOL can increase mission flexibility required by SOF missions. See Table 2 for 
examples of mission timeline slips on aircraft on-station time.  
Table 2.   Mission slip effects to on- station time. 
Available On-Station Time 
No Slip 1+30 
1-hour slip airborne 0+40 
1-hour slip engines running on 
ground 1+10 (1+30 if hot gas available) 
1-hour slip APU alert on ground 1+25 
This data shows aircraft can maintain potential on station times if kept on ground alert. 
Once an aircraft is airborne, reductions in engine power while loitering only provides a 
limited slip capability without air refueling or significantly impacting on station time. 
The AF does not use the same terminology to describe levels of ground alert as 




Table 3.   Typical A-10 alert status terminology and fuel burn. 
 
 
The following fictional scenario was published in the Air and Space Power Journal 
June 2015. It is a good example how U.S. and NATO forces can utilize FARP to remain 
unpredictable, lethal, and survivable against a near peer threat in future conflicts. 
A lone C-17 landed smoothly in the predawn hours at Amari Air Base, 
Estonia. The C-17 was from the Heavy Airlift Wing in Papa, Hungary. 
Amari had yet to experience the devastation of a Russian air attack. The 
sheer number of NATO basing options made targeting all of them 
impossible and had so far kept Amari safe. The cargo ramp was already 
lowering as the C-17 taxied to a stop and USAF Airmen piled out. The 
seemingly deserted base came alive as Airmen began organizing the ramp. 
There were aircraft maintainers, operations and intelligence personnel, and 
a squad of security forces. They went to work immediately, unlocking and 
organizing munitions, connecting fuel lines to hydrants, and setting up 
expeditionary defensive fighting positions. The operations and intelligence 
personnel set up a deployed ops center. In less than an hour, four Dutch F-
16s entered the traffic pattern and landed quickly. Like the C-17, the fighters 
had barely come to a stop before Airmen clambered over them, helping the 
pilots unstrap and egress. The aircrews were hustled to the waiting 
intelligence officers while the aircraft were reloaded with bombs and fuel. 
The operations update and intel briefings would last just as long as it took 
the Airmen to rearm and refuel the jets. They would then depart on their 
next combat mission—their third of the night. In less than two hours, the F-
16s were gone, and the C-17 was taxiing for takeoff. The next base was 
Łask in Poland where a flight of U.S. F-16s was scheduled to join them. 
The C-17 could do this three more times before it had to return to Ramstein 
and refit. NATO forces were repeating this scene all over Eastern Europe. 
The war is going well; Russia simply doesn’t have the capacity to fight 
across such a broad front.109 
                                                 
109 Entire scenario taken from Brown, Spacey, and Glover. “Unteathered Operations: Rapid Mobility 
and Forward Basing Are Keys to Airpower’s Success in the A2/AD Environment,”18. 
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The previous scenario, combined with statements in the most recent Quadrennial 
Review and National Defense Strategy indicate defense senior leaders understand the 
benefits and risks of dispersed, adaptive, agile, austere, and untethered operations. Future 
operational areas and threat environments will not resemble the Iraq and Afghanistan fights 
of the past decade. As stated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, to be successful in 
future conflicts the United States must remain “strategically predictable, but operationally 
unpredictable”110 The benefits of adaptive basing provide some of the operational 
unpredictability required to be successful in future conflicts.  
                                                 
110 Mattis, National Defense Strategy: Unclassified Summary, 5, 
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III. REQUIREMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR A-10 FARP 
The following chapter highlights some of the requirements and considerations for 
A-10 operations at austere locations. This list is not all encompassing, but offers some 
considerations for mission planners and helps set realistic expectations for capabilities and 
LIMFACs. 
A. RUNWAY LENGTH 
The A-10 cannot operate from the same short assault strips utilized by conventional 
an unconventional cargo aircraft. Table 4 shows minimum runway lengths for cargo 
aircraft that will typically accompany A-10s at austere locations. A-10s demonstrated the 
capability to operate off of runways as short as 3000 ft in European exercises in the 
1980s.111 A-10 operating instructions state the minimum runway dimensions for A-10 
operations is 5000 ft in length by 75 ft wide. However, operating an A-10 from a 5000 ft 
runway is impractical or impossible for most environments and most weapons and fuel 
loads required for combat.  
 
                                                 
111 Haden, A-10 FARP OPERATIONS Forward Arming and Refueling Point, 3. 
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Table 4.   Minimum runway lengths for cargo aircraft.112 
 
C-130s and C-17s can operate from fields as short as 3000 feet. While longer runways may 
be required for heavy cargo loads or runway environments, the required runway for these 
cargo aircraft is significantly shorter than A-10 runway requirements. 
 
A-10 takeoff distance is the key factor in determining the required runway length. 
There are six key factors that affect take off distance (Runway Elevation, Temperature, 
Aircraft Weight, Runway Surface, Runway Slope, Surface Wind). Required runway length 
will be drastically different while conducting summer operations in Afghanistan compared 
to winter operations in South Korea. Table 5 shows approximate elevations and 





                                                 
112 Source: Department of the Air Force, Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations, 46. 
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Niger 1500’ 41°C/26°C 28°C/11°C 
Central Syria 1000’-3000’ 36°C/20°C 11°C/1°C 
South Korea <1000’ 28°C/22°C 0°C/-6°C 
Balkans 1000’ 20°C/13°C 0°C/-6°C 
 Yemen 1000’-3000’ 30°C/16°C 25°C/4°C 
C Iran 1000’-6000’ 37°C/16°C 10°C/-3°C 
S Afghanistan 3000’-6000’ 41°C/28°C 13°C/3°C 
Libya 1000’ 33°C/21°C 16°C/9°C 
South China Sea 0’ 33°C/23°C 19°C/13°C 
Notes: Temperature data pulled form Accuweather.com. 
 
Air Force regulations state takeoff distance should not exceed 80% of available 
runway length in training.113 While 80% is a training restriction, it does help add a margin 
of safety to account for fluctuations in engine performance, environmental conditions, and 
pilot proficiency in an operational environment. For the following tables, the 80% rule will 
be used to calculate minimum runway requirements. 
1. Elevation 
The elevation of the take-off field can significantly impact take off distances. Jet 
engines lose thrust as runway elevation increases.114 Lower thrust equates to longer take 
off distances. Table 6 and Table 7 show the effect of elevation on A-10 takeoff distance 
for a 43,000 lb and 40,000 lb aircraft. 
                                                 
113 AFI 11–2A-10C vol 3, A-10C—Operations Procedures states “On training missions, do not takeoff 
if the computed takeoff roll exceeds 80 percent of the available runway.” Per 11–2A-10C operational 
missions can break the 80% criteria, however even for combat mission it is a good planning criteria to add 
a small margin of safety. 
114 An increase in runway elevation or increase in temperature leads to an increase in pressure altitude. 
Pressure altitude, for lack of a better term, describes the “thickness of the air.” Thinner air equals less 
thrust. 
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Table 6.   Elevation effects on takeoff distance for a 43,000 lb A-10115 
 Effects of Field Elevation on A-10 Take Off Distance 













0’ MSL 5479 6027 6849 7534 
2000’ MSL 6855 7541 8569 9426 
4000’ MSL 8119 8931 10149 11164 
6000’ MSL 9586 10545 11983 13181 
 Notes: 
All Distances in Feet with a 43,000 lb aircraft at 20 degrees Celsius 
Assumed CBR of dirt is 16 (10% increase in T/O Distance) 
Minimum Runway Length is calculated so T/O distance does not exceed 80% of 
available runway.  
Table 7.   Elevation effects on takeoff distance for a 40,000 lb A-10116 
 Effects of Field Elevation on A-10 Take Off Distance 















0’ MSL 4498 4948 5623 6185 
2000’ MSL 5594 6153 6993 7692 
4000’ MSL 6710 7381 8388 9226 
6000’ MSL 7923 8715 9904 10894 
 Notes: 
All Distances in Feet with a 40,000 lb aircraft at 20 degrees Celsius 
Assumed CBR of dirt is 16 (10% increase in T/O Distance) 
Minimum Runway Length is calculated so T/O distance does not exceed 80% 
of available runway.  
2. Temperature 
Jet engines lose thrust as temperature increases leading to longer take off distances 
at higher temperatures. Planning around average high temperatures is a good starting point, 
but mission planners must also consider an appropriate margin of error, and consider 
                                                 
115 Calculated with A-10 mission planning software JMPS UPC Suite 8 SR1. 
116 Calculated with A-10 mission planning software JMPS UPC Suite 8 SR1. 
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weapons of fuel adjustments in case temperatures are unseasonably warm. Tables 7 and 8 
show the effects of temperature on T/O distances. 
Table 8.   Temperature effects on takeoff distance for a 43,000 lb A-10117 
 Effects of Temperature on A-10 Take Off Distance 













0 C 4138 4552 5173 5690 
10 C 4775 5253 5969 6566 
20 C 5479 6027 6849 7534 
30 C 6312 6943 7890 8679 
40 C 7492 8241 9365 10302 
 
Notes: 
All Distances in Feet with a 43,000 lb aircraft at Sea Level 
Assumed CBR of dirt is 16 (10% increase in T/O Distance) 
Minimum Runway Length is calculated so T/O distance does not exceed 80% of 
available runway.  
Table 9.   Temperature effects on takeoff distance for a 43,000lb A-10118 
 Effects of Temperature on A-10 Take Off Distance 













0 C 3413 3754 4266(5000) 4693(5000) 
10 C 3910 4301 4888(5000) 5376 
20 C 4498 4948 5623 6185 
30 C 5217 5739 6521 7173 
40 C 6192 6811 7740 8514 
 Notes: 
All Distances in Feet with a 40,000 pound aircraft at Sea Level 
Assumed CBR of dirt is 16 (10% increase in T/O Distance) 
Minimum Runway Length is calculated so T/O distance does not exceed 80% of 
available runway. 
Minimum A-10 runway length is 5000 ft per A-10 operating instructions  
                                                 
117 Calculated with A-10 mission planning software JMPS UPC Suite 8 SR1. 
118 Calculated with A-10 mission planning software JMPS UPC Suite 8 SR1. 
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3. Aircraft Weight 
Takeoff distances increase as aircraft weight increases. As aircraft take on more 
fuel and weapons, weight increases. To reduce weight, fuel quantities can be reduced. An 
A-10 with a full fuel load under normal operating conditions, utilizing standard fuel 
reserves, can stay airborne for two to two and a half hours depending on throttle positions 
required during flight. A full fuel load is around 11,000 pounds. Reducing the fuel load by 
1000 pounds reduces flight time by approximately 20 minutes or .3 hours.119 
An aircraft can also reduce weapons load to shorten takeoff distances. The tactical 
situation will determine if reducing weapons or fuel is appropriate for the mission. Table 
11 shows estimated A-10 weights for basic weapons and fuel loads. Ground commanders 
should communicate weapons capability and on station time requirements to mission 
planners to ensure the proper weapons loadout and fuel quantity is identified. Table 10 
shows how A-10 takeoff distance is affected by aircraft weight.  
Table 10.   Aircraft weight effects on A-10 takeoff distance120 
 Effects of Weight on A-10 Take Off Distance 














38k 4001 4401 5001 5501 
40k 4584 5042 5730 6303 
42k 5191 5710 6489 7138 
44k 5769 6346 7211 7932 
46k 6457 7103 8071 8878 
 
Notes: 
All Distances in Feet with a field at Sea Level 20C 
Assumed CBR of dirt is 16 (10% increase in T/O Distance) 
Minimum Runway Length is calculated so T/O distance does not exceed 80% of 
available runway.  
 
                                                 
119 Based on an A-10 burning 3000 lbs of fuel an hour. Fuel burn can increase 6000lb/hr if operating at 
low altitudes with high power settings. 
120 Calculated with A-10 mission planning software JMPS UPC Suite 8 SR1. 
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Table 11.   Basic aircraft weights for example weapons and fuel load outs 
 Aircraft Weight vs Example Load Out 
A/C Weight Loadout 
Typical Flight 
Time 
34k 1/2 Gun, 40% Fuel 45 min 
36k 1/2 Gun 60% Fuel 1 hr 20 min 
38k RKTs, 85% Fuel 2 hr 
39k  2x RKT Pods, AGM65, 85% Fuel 2 hr 
40k  Full Gun, Full Fuel 2.5 hr 
41k  RKTs, AGM65 2.5 hr 
42k RKTs, AGM65, 2x SM Bombs 2.5 hr 
43k RKTs, AGM65, 4x SM Bombs 2.5 hr 
44k RKTs, AGM65, 1x LG Bomb, 2x SM Bombs 2.5 hr 
46k Rkt, AGM65, 2xBomb, Ext Fuel Tank 3.75 hr 
  
Notes:  
All load outs include a TGP and full fuel, full gun, unless otherwise noted. LG 
Bomb equals a 2000-pound bomb (GBU-31). SM bomb equals a 500-pound 
bomb (GBU-38, GBU-12, MK-83. AGM65 assumes a Laser variant with a 300lb 
warhead. Full fuel is 11000 pounds. External fuel tank holds an additional 4000 
pounds of fuel and must be a Sgt Fletcher type. Typical flight time is time from 
takeoff to landing with required fuel reserves, burning 3200 lbs/hr. Fight time 
can fluctuate based on increased fuel reserve requirements and power settings 
required during flight. 
 
4. Runway CBR rating.  
Airfield surveyors use California Bearing Rating (CBR) to measure the hardness, 
strength, and durability of semi-prepared surfaces IAW Engineering Technical Letter 
(ETL) 02–19: Airfield Pavement Evaluation Standards and Procedures. For A-10 aircraft, 
the runway CBR value determines the maximum take-off weight, maximum landing 
weight, and percentage of takeoff distance increase compared to a concrete runway. A-10 
takeoff distance increases as a percentage of the concrete takeoff distance per Table 12. 
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CBR can also determines maximum takeoff and landing weight. The takeaway 
from the two tables below is that operating on dirt runways with less than a CBR of 16 
could significantly impact operations. The absolute minimum is 10 with a recommended 
minimum CBR of 14 for training.122 Table 13 shows the maximum A-10 takeoff weight as 
a function of CBR while Table 14 illustrates the maximum landing weight. In addition to 
length and CBR rating, the runway should be free of debris chunks greater than 1.5 inches 
diameter, unavoidable ruts greater than 3 inches deep, and free of any sharp metal debris 
such as shrapnel, metal links, or bullet casings.123 
Table 13.   Maximum A-10 takeoff weight versus runway CBR ratings124 







>16 Std -1 limits 
 
                                                 
121 Source: USAF Warfare Center, A-10 Forward Area Arming and Refueling Tactics Development 
and Evaluation Final Report, 7. 
122 USAF Warfare Center, A-10 Forward Area Arming and Refueling Tactics Development and 
Evaluation Final Report, 6. 
123 USAF Warfare Center, A-10 Forward Area Arming and Refueling Tactics Development and 
Evaluation Final Report, 5. 
124 Source: USAF Warfare Center, A-10 Forward Area Arming and Refueling Tactics Development 
and Evaluation Final Report, 6. 
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Table 14.   Maximum A-10 landing weight versus runway CBR ratings125 
CBR Max Landing GW (lbs) CBR 
Max Landing GW 
(lbs) 
10 32,500 15 38,000 
11 33,500 16 39,000 
12 34,500 17-20 40,000 
13 35,500 21-29 41,000 
14 37,000 30-40 42,000 
 
The biggest takeaway for mission planners is small assault strips utilized by C-
130s, CASAs, or other tactical airlift may not work for A-10 FARP operations. Mission 
planners and Combat Control Teams (CCTs) should contact the A-10 unit directly for 
specific runway requirements for a specific location and desired combat load out. However, 
8000 feet in length is a good rule of thumb for airfield elevations less than 2000 feet MSL 
and temperatures less than 30 degrees Celsius and 10000 feet in length for airfield 
elevations greater than 2000 feet MSL or temperatures above 30 degrees Celsius. 
B. COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) 
A team of combat controllers is essential for conducting air operations at an austere 
location. The CCT will be responsible for certifying the runway is ready for operations, 
completing a landing zone survey and FARP survey if required, providing air traffic control 
(ATC) services at the airfield (air and ground aircraft movement and deconfliction), or 
even providing terminal attack control in the event of a base attack. The CCT is responsible 
for a wide variety of critical mission tasks. Mission planners must consult a CCT expert to 
ensure an adequate amount Combat Controllers are assigned to the mission to accomplish 
these tasks and provide some redundancy. The single CCT member assigned to a SOF 
element to provide JTAC support is likely not sufficient to accomplish airfield survey and 
ATC functions. 
                                                 
125 Source: USAF Warfare Center, A-10 Forward Area Arming and Refueling Tactics Development 
and Evaluation Final Report, 6. 
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C. LZ AND FARP SURVEY 
Operations in combat and training, require two important documents to conduct air 
operations at an austere field. A landing zone LZ survey and FARP survey must be 
completed and approved prior to commencing operations. An LZ survey is annotated on 
an AF IMT 3822. In a deployed environment, LZ surveys of prepared and semi-prepared 
surfaces can be conducted by a Combat Control Team (CCT) or Contingency Response 
Group (CRG) airfield assessment teams that include Air Force Civil Engineering Support 
Activity (AFCESA) personnel.126 During normal operations, request for LZ surveys should at 
least 120 days prior to intended use.127 During contingency operations, with the appropriate 
remote Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) CCT teams can verify 
and certify LZ surveys within a matter of minutes from boots on the ground.128 
In addition to the an LZ survey, Air Force aircraft also require a completed AF 4006 
to complete FARP operations. Details on AF 4006 requirements can be found in AFI 11–235 
Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP) Operations. Of note, AF 11–235 only discusses 
refueling requirements, it does not discuss weapons reloading requirements and considerations. 
Army Field manual 4–30.13 Appendix J discusses some considerations for reloading munitions 
at FOLs.129 
D. FIRE FIGHTING 
As learned from Operation Eagle Claw, fires at a FARP location can be deadly, 
especially FARP locations that lack firefighting capability (Figure 19). Commanders must 
balance the acceptable level of risk (ALR) with mission requirements, available assets, and 
expected contingencies. Having an appropriate level of fire-fighting equipment and 
                                                 
126 Department of the Air Force, Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations, 57. 
127 Department of the Air Force, Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations, 57. 
128 Jimmy Larsen, personal communication, September 4, 2018. Surveys can be verified within 30 
minutes if utilizing a prepared surface. If using a semi-prepared surface and soil samples need to be taken, 
the process can take up to 4 hours. Once the LZ Survey is complete it must be forwarded to the appropriate 
authority for approval. Approval authorities can be found in 13–217. Completed LZ surveys can be found 
at located at https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO-OP-AM-40. 
129 Department of the Army, Ammunition Handbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Munitions Handlers, FM 4–30.13 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm_4-30.13%2801%29.pdf 
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personnel available at a FOL can reduce overall mission risk, but can drastically increase 
logistical requirements. Table 15 lists the desired and minimum levels of firefighting 
capability per type of aircraft. Further details can be found in AFPAM 32–2004 Aircraft 
Fire Protection for Exercises and Contingency Response Operations and AFTTP 3–32.42 
Contingency Firefighting Operations130 Regulations do state that locations with 
“occasional” take off and landings do not require fire and emergency services (FES).131 
The waiver authority for firefighting capability rests with the theatre Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) or MAJCOM/A3. 
Figure 19.  Operation Eagle Claw aftermath132 
 
Picture of a burned EC-130 and H-53 at a FARP location during Operation 
Eagle Claw in 1980. The fire caused eight U.S. fatalities. 
  
                                                 
130 Department of the Air Force, Aircraft Fire Protection for Exercises and Contingency Response 
Operations, AFPAM 32–2004 (Washington, DC, Department of the Air Force, 2014); Department of the 
Air Force, Contingency Firefighting Operations, AFTTP 3–32.41 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air 
Force, 2016). 
131 AFPAM 32–2004 Aircraft Fire Protection for Exercises and Contingency Response Operations 
defines occasional as no more than 4 fighter type aircraft or 2 heavy type aircraft takeoff and landing in 7 
days. 
132 Source: https://www.socom.mil/Pages/USSOCOM-celebrates-its-30th-anniversary.aspx 
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Table 15.   Levels of fire and emergency services133 
 
Table 15 applies to fire-fighting requirements for short-term, small scale operations 
lasting less than 120 days. Firefighting requirements may be excluded if less than four 
takeoffs and landings are made within seven days, or if waived by the JFACC134. 
 
E. SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR MAINTENANCE AND LOADING 
WEAPONS. 
1. Weapons loading 
Reloading A-10 munitions at a MOB or FOL does require some specialized 
equipment. Mission planners must consider expected mission requirements, mission 
duration, available logistics capacity, and FOL capability in determining the fuel and 
weapons requirements at the FOL. Taking on fuel only, requires no additional maintenance 
or equipment support. Reloading weapons will require at least six A-10 maintenance 
personnel and some specialized equipment.135 Longer duration operations will require 
more personnel and more equipment. 
                                                 
133 Source: Department of the Air Force, Aircraft Fire Protection for Exercises and Contingency 
Response Operations, 4. 
134 Department of the Air Force, Aircraft Fire Protection for Exercises and Contingency Response 
Operations, 5. 
135 Kyle Rykaczewski, FOL Operations: A Checklist for the Weapons Officer (student paper, USAF 
Weapons School, 2014), 5. Rykaczewski lists a 3-person weapons load crew, 1 weapons expeditor, 1 crew 
chief at the loading locations and 1 crew chief at the refueling location as the minimum maintenance 
package (6 people total). 
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Reloading the GAU-8 Avenger, the A-10s 30 mm cannon, requires a GAU-8 
Ammunition Loading System (ALS) and ammunition cans loaded on an MHU-141 
munitions trailer. An ALS is shown in Figure 20. Each loaded trailer can support 2 full gun 
reloads or 4 half gun reloads. For planning purposes, the cargo weight requirement to 
support a gun reload is 17,500 lbs. Adding an Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System 
(APKWS) reloading capability bumps the weight up to 19,000 lbs.136 As demonstrated in 
exercises, a single MC-130 can support this cargo requirement.137 Reloading 500 lb freefall 
munitions or AGM-65s require additional bomb lifts and munitions trailers. See Table 16 
for A-10 equipment basic weight and dimensions of equipment required for weapons 
reloading.  
Figure 20.  GAU-8 ALS, required for A-10 gun reloads138 
 
 
                                                 
136 Rykaczewski, FOL Operations: A Checklist for the Weapons Officer. These numbers assume all 
equipment and munitions are transported to the FOL via aircraft. Weight and pallet requirements can be 
reduced if equipment and munitions are prepositioned at or near the FOL. 
137 Specifically, Advanced Guard 2014 demonstrated this. It has been exercised and verified several 





Table 16.   Basic cargo planning data for A-10 weapons loading equipment139 
ITEM Length (in) Width (in) Weight (lb) 
MJ-1 Bomb Lift Truck 145 68 4160 
MHU-83 Bomb Lift Truck* 177 89-113 7320 
GAU-8 ALS 191 77 2800 
MHU-141 Munitions Trailer** 126 89 2900 
* Required for AGM-65 loading 
**Unloaded trailer weight 
 
Of note, the Air Force does not train to loading heavy weapons (500 lb bombs and 
AGM-65s) without the use of bomb lift trucks. If the Air Force adopted manual weapons 
loading techniques similar to Navy carrier loading operations paired with manually 
operated bomb lift devices, it could greatly reduce the cargo capacity requirement for 
munitions loading. 
2. Liquid Oxygen  
Most A-10s require liquid oxygen (LOX) to supply pilots with adequate breathable 
oxygen in flight. Without adequate oxygen provided by LOX pilots are susceptible to 
hypoxia, especially when flying in the medium altitude environment.140 LOX can be 
difficult transport and difficult to obtain away from a MOB. An A-10s LOX supply can be 
depleted in three days of flying operations. Mission planners should consider three days as 
the maximum time an A-10 can operate away from a location MOB without LOX 
available.141 
Limited number of A-10s in the current inventory were converted to an on-board 
oxygen generating system (OBOGS). Jets outfitted with OBOGS do not require LOX 
servicing and can potentially operate away from a MOB longer than a non-outfitted jet. 
Recommend the AF invest in outfitting more A-10s with OBOGS to increase the capability 
and reduce the logistical requirements of A-10 austere operations. 
                                                 
139 Source: Rykaczewski, FOL Operations: A Checklist for the Weapons Officer, 9. 
140 Medium altitude tactics are designed to fly above small arms and small caliber AAA threats.  
141 Rykaczewski, FOL Operations: A Checklist for the Weapons Officer referencing a recommendation 
from A-10 maintenance production superintendent. 
 57 
IV. CHALLENGES 
There are challenges and risks that accompany basing airplanes at forward 
operating locations. None of the challenges are insurmountable and most can be mitigated 
through proper planning, preparation, and rehearsal. Whether the US Air Force is providing 
air support to troops thousands of miles from a main operating base, or assets need to be 
dispersed to avoid attack during a major conflict, the benefits can greatly outweigh the 
risks. The following list of challenges and risks is not exhaustive nor all inclusive, but 
rather covers some of the major contingencies specific to operating from a FOL. 
A. AUSTERE BASE ATTACK 
1. Challenge 
Austere bases may lack significant dedicated security forces. Each location and 
tactical environment will have its own unique security challenges and specific security 
measures is beyond the scope of this paper. The basic assumption is that the host unit or 
base will provide adequate security at the FOL, however, there are some mitigating factors 
aviation units can consider.  
2. Mitigation 
Putting forward deploying maintenance personnel through additional combat arms 
and weapons qualification training can help better prepare for a base attack. Maintenance 
personnel must train to performing maintenance while donned in a full Kevlar kit and 
carrying a weapon.142 Additionally, maintenance personnel should cross train between 
specialties to add some redundancy to maintenance functions. (e.g. training a weapons 
troop how to service engine oil)  
Consider the use of Phoenix Raven security forces. The USAF Phoenix Ravens are 
specifically trained to protect Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircrew and airplanes in 
austere environments. These high demand, low density personnel can help provide base 
                                                 
142 The 442 AMXS at Whiteman AFB developed recommendation for maintainer Kevlar kit 
configurations. Contact 442 AMXS for more information.  
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and aircraft security and identify considerations for security personnel not accustom to 
protecting large vulnerable aircraft. Additionally, Air Combat Command (ACC) should 
consider sending select security forces personnel through the Phoenix Raven training 
course to provide personnel specifically trained to protect fighter aircraft in austere 
locations. 
B. MINIMUM MANNING 
1. Challenge 
The finite amount of personnel sustainment resources (e.g. food and lodging) at a 
FOL combined with limited transportation resources often necessitates passenger 
manifests are reduced to the bare minimum for mission accomplishment. A-10 operations 
and maintenance personnel may not have the available manpower they typically enjoy at a 
MOB. Lower levels of manpower limit the ability to surge operations if required, or 
continue planned production levels in the event of injury, illness, or casualty. 
2. Mitigation 
Conducting joint cross servicing training and familiarization can provide a force 
multiplier and promote operational resiliency in an austere environment. Recurring joint 
training exercises (e.g. Jaded Thunder, MLAT, Emerald Warrior) focus almost exclusively 
on operations. Adding a cross familiarization or maintenance integration portion to these 
exercises could be beneficial to a deployed environment. Teaching an Army Ranger how 
to operate a bomb lift truck, an Army AH-64 mechanic how to load rockets on an A-10, an 
MC-130 crew chief how to service LOX, or an A-10 mechanic how to change an MRAP 
tire could greatly increase redundancy, enables operational resiliency, and can reduce the 
logistical footprint required to operate at a FOL.  
Conducting jet familiarization at exercises or entering into formal cross-servicing 
agreements can add flexibility and extra man power while operating away from MOBs in 
a coalition environment as well. In the past, NATO focused on setting up a host of servicing 
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agreements and multinational maintenance exercises.143 Most cross-servicing exercises 
and agreements ended in 2007, but have reemerged as NATO faces a more aggressive 
threats to its east.144 The basic construct would allow a four-ship of US F-16s could land 
in Campia Turzii Airbase in Romania, be fully serviced with fuel and weapons by Polish 
maintainers, then take off to support a NATO combat mission. Those same maintainers 
could then service a four-ship of Spanish Eurofighters 30 minutes later. To complete this, 
the Polish maintainers need to be trained in servicing F-16s and Eurofighters and a cross-
servicing logistical agreement must be in place to establish who “pays” for the gas and 
weapons. Unfortunately, unlike the F-16, Eurofighter, and Joint Strike Fighter, the US is 
the sole operator A-10s so there isn’t a resident servicing knowledge base already present 
with allied nations. This means the A-10 community needs to make a conscious effort to 
build this knowledge base in NATO. 
C. “HARD-BROKE” JET 
1. Challenge  
Having a hard-broke jet (a jet that requires significant maintenance before it is 
flyable), in an austere environment with minimal maintenance support is a significant risk 
to FOL operations. A-10s are extremely reliable, but like any aircraft, can break 
unexpectedly. It is unacceptable to have a jet broken in the desert for an extended period 
of time. There are extensive mitigating actions units can take to reduce the likelihood of a 
hard-broke jet. 
2. Mitigation 
Limit or eliminate engine shut downs while in an austere environment. A jet that is 
running rarely hard breaks. Shutting down jets increases the likely hood of a hard-broke 
                                                 
143 NATO exercises like Exercise Ample Train in 2001 focused on familiarizing maintenance 
personnel on servicing requirements of each participants airplanes. According to NATO “The aim of 
Exercise Ample Train 2001 is to allow ground crews to acquire experience in aircraft cross-servicing so 
that aircraft from any of the member countries participating in the aircraft cross-servicing programme can 
be maintained and continue their missions.” 
https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/news_18720.htm?selectedLocale=en 
144 Air Operations Branch JAPCC, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, accessed November 10, 2018, 
https://www.japcc.org/portfolio/aircraft-cross-servicing-reactivation. 
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jet. If an engine does not start, the jet isn’t flying. In an austere environment refueling 
and weapons loading should be completed with engines running to the max extent. 
Eventually engines need to be shut down for basic servicing. Around 12 hours is about the 
maximum duration an A-10 engine should be allowed to run before shutting down and 
servicing oil. 
Units must derive minimum equipment subsystem list (MESL) specific to FOLs. 
In an austere environment, if a jet has two good engines and hydraulic systems, it might 
not be fully mission capable, but it is likely flyable. Peace time or even MESLs used to fly 
at the MOB should not apply. As an example, in the A-10, which has 3 radios, the ARC-
164 UHF radio is must be operational for the jet to be considered flyable. The ARC-164 is 
the only radio of the 3 that can operate on battery power only. It is required to radio for 
help during ground emergencies or with certain electrical malfunctions. While an 
inoperative ARC-164 will keep a jet grounded for a training mission, it should not keep a 
jet grounded at a FOL. 
Jet maintenance go/no go decisions must be pushed down to the pilot and on scene 
maintenance team. Decisions that typically get routed to O-6 levels for approval must stay 
at the local level at an FOL. Decisions made at the local level can happen quicker, with 
more situational awareness, and do not require communication reach back to a home 
headquarters. This should fall in line with current USAF efforts to empower squadron 
commanders. US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Goldfein, stated empowering squadron 
leadership and focusing on mission command is key to aligning Air Force culture and 
command and control with the National Defense Strategy.145 
A maintenance recovery team (MRT) should be kept on call with the appropriate 
transportation ready to rapidly deploy in response to hard broke jet. The MRT must have 
access to the required spare parts and maintenance specialists to facilitate the rapid repair 
and recovery of a hard-broke jet at a FOL. For extreme distances between a MOB and FOL 
                                                 




mission, planners could consider deploying an MRT and mission ready spare package 
(MRSP) to a secure forward area ready to respond to a FOL if required. 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. Challenge 
FOLs with limited communications capabilities or advisories with robust 
communications jamming capabilities challenge traditional centralized command and 
control of Air Force assets. Directing sorties via the Air Tasking Order is not optimal and 
limits flexibility while conducting distributed operations. Additionally, supporting SOF 
mission sets from a FOL could require increased aircraft flexibly beyond the 72-hour ATO 
cycle to accomplish the mission. Currently an ATO tasking dictates most aspects of an air 
mission to include, take off and land times, target(s), refueling times, and weapons 
loadout.146  
2. Mitigation 
The dynamic nature of SOF missions, especially with potentially limited 
communication reach back to HHQ, necessitate execution decisions to be pushed to the 
lowest practical levels. For distributed operations, the AF should implement mission 
command comprised of a clear commander’s intent, broad mission orders, and 
decentralized execution. Mission orders are orders with a clear commander’s intent, but 
allow the appropriate amount of flexibility on how to execute the mission to achieve 
success. As General Homs stated in 2018, the Air Force needs to empower young leaders 




                                                 
146 See Air Force Doctrine Volume 3 Command, Annex 3-0 Operations and Planning 
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Annex_3-0/3-0-D29-I-OPS-The-Tasking-Cycle.pdf. For 
more information on the ATO process. 
147 Tirpak, "The Air Force's ‘Forever War’ is its Toughest Pill to Swallow," 
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Mission orders could be as vague as:  
• Provide ODA 1234 with CAS from X Date/Time to Y Date/Time.  
• Prevent enemy armored vehicles from crossing X Bridge from X 
Date/Time to Y Date/Time.  
• Provide Alert CSAR with 30 min response to TGT A from X Time to Y 
time.  
The unit then has the flexibility to determine how to best support the assigned 
mission, when to fly, and what ordnance to carry. This level of decentralized execution is 
required for distributed operations. 
E. WEATHER 
1. Challenge 
Inclement weather can pose a significant risk to FOL operations. Austere FOL 
locations can lack the offboard navigation equipment and published instrument approach 
procedures available at MOBs. In order to fly an approach to an airfield in instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC) a published department of defense (DOD) or approved 
commercial approach procedure must exist.148 Creating an approved DOD approach is a 
lengthy process that requires a TERPS team on the ground to conduct an airfield survey.149 
Fighter aircraft are not approved to fly GPS approaches. Instrument approaches 
must be flown using a TACAN, ILS, or both. This equipment is likely not available at 
FOLs and is not practical to install and certify them for temporary FOL operations. 
Therefore, all fighter approaches into FOL must me made under visual metrological 
conditions (VMC). AFI 11- 202 volume 3 General Flight Rules defines VMC as weather 
                                                 
148 Department of the Air Force, Instrument Flight Operations, AFM 11-217 Vol 1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Air Force, 2010), 92. 
 
 63 
greater than 1500-foot ceilings and three statute mile horizontal visibility.150 Terrain and 
obstacles in vicinity of the FOL may increase ceiling and visibility requirements for safe 
takeoff and landing operations. 
2. Mitigation 
• Consider VMC weather in the mission GO/NO GO criteria.  
• Include an Air Force Special Operations Weather Technician (SOWT) at 
the FOL location. SOWTs are Air Force special operators that specialize is 
metrological and environmental analysis and forecasting.151 
• A-10 mission planners should plan for weather let down procedures in 
vicinity of the FOL. Weather let down procedures allow a pilot do descend 
through IMC conditions at achieve VMC conditions prior to landing. 
• A-10 mission planners should create 3-D glidepath GPS approach points 
enhance pilot situational awareness and aid runway identification in 
marginal weather.152 
F. WET RUNWAY 
1. Risk 
Standing water on a runway can cause dangerous hydroplaning conditions during 
aircraft takeoff and landing operations. Hydroplaning can lead to loss of aircraft control at 
high speeds. Conventional runways are constructed with a crown in the middle to quickly 
shed rainfall and prevent standing water on the runway. Operating from an unconventional 
                                                 
150 Department of the Air Force, General Flight Rules, AFI 11-202 Vol 3 (Washington DC: 
Department of the Air Force, 2016), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3/publication/afi11-
202v3/afi11-202v3.pdf, 49. 
151 See https://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/special-operations-weather-technician for more 
information on SOWT capabilities. 
152 Recommendation from “Unimproved Surface Ops” (course academics, A-10C Weapons Instructor 
Course, Nellis AFB NV, 2014) 
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runway surface (e.g. dirt, highways, and roads) likely means the surface may not be 
optimized to disperse water in the event of rainfall.  
If operating from a dirt runway, recent rainfall can render a dirt strip unusable for 
significant periods of time. The rain decreases the load bearing capacity of the dirt runway, 
or standing water can submerge the runway. For example, A-10 training operations on 
Delmar Lake (a dry lake bed near Nellis AFB Nevada) can be suspended for a week or 
more following heavy rain fall.153 
2. Mitigation 
Consider recent weather and its effect on runway conditions in mission GO/NO GO 
criteria. Often weather in the target area is considered, but weather in and around the 
aircraft point of departure is an afterthought, especially if the aircraft depart from a location 
different from the ground unit.  
Allow CCT personnel ample time on the ground to assess runway conditions and 
adjust the landing location/surface as required. Consult the CCT assigned to the mission 
for an expected timeline to clear a new field. As a rule of thumb allow a CCT team 30 
minutes to assess a prepared surface (a concrete runway that is currently used or 
abandoned). If operating from a semi-prepared surface, allow the CCT team 4 hours before 
the first fighter aircraft arrive. Four hours is required to conduct soil samples to determine 
the load bearing capacity of the surface.154 
Utilize all means available to gather real time imagery/intelligence of runway 
conditions if utilizing on unoccupied FOL prior to mission execution. The means and 
methods of doing so are beyond the scope of the paper. Mission planners must keep in 
mind, especially when deploying to an unoccupied FOL with a semi-prepared surface, the 
effects of heavy rain fall on a runway can last for weeks. 
                                                 
153 Tim Geist, personal communication, May 1, 2107. 
154 Jimmy Larsen, personal communication, September 4, 2018 
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G. FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE (FOD) 
1. Challenge 
Rocks, trash, birds, and other debris when ingested into an aircraft engine can have 
devastating effects. The high placement of A-10’s turbofan engines above the ground make 
it less susceptible to FOD than any other fighter aircraft in the US inventory. Other fighter 
aircraft with lower air intakes are susceptible to “pulling” FOD causing items off the 
ground. Typically, an A-10 engine doesn’t create a strong enough vacuum to ingest objects 
that are laying on the ground. The A-10 is susceptible to items blowing in the wind, items 
blown up by other aircraft engine blast, or items sitting on top of an elevated surface 
increase the risk of ingestion. 
Objects such as shrapnel, bullet casings, or large rocks can damage tires as a 
40,000-pound aircraft rolls over it. Aircraft tires must be free of defects to withstand the 
high speeds of takeoffs and the high impacts of landings. Changing a tire, if one is even 
available in an austere environment, can be a daunting, laborsome task. 
2. Mitigation 
In accordance with AFI 13-217 Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations, the 
runway environment should be clear of rocks greater than one and half inches, shrapnel or 
metal in and around the runway and FARP area. Conducting a rapid “FOD sweep” 
periodically or after events such as a base attack or heavy aircraft departure can help 
identify and remove hazardous objects. 
Keep helicopter ingress and egress routes away from FARP locations, and ensure 
aircraft taxi routes do not blow FOD into the FARP area. Helicopters hovering over fixed 
wing aircraft create FOD hazards. Large jet engines from aircraft like C-17s can blow FOD 
causing debris for hundreds of feet. Rocks and debris that would have stayed on the ground 
can be thrown up to engine level. Operating from semi-prepared surfaces increases this 
risk.  
If a strong wind is creating a lot of potential FOD, consider shutting down engines 
during FARP operations. Ideally, all ground operations should be conducted with the 
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engines running in order to reduce the risk of an engine “no-start” or major malfunction 
during start-up. However, in some windy situations, it may reduce risk to shut engines 
down. 
This is not an exhaustive list of the challenges and risks of operating aircraft from 
a FOL, rather it covers some of the specific challenges specific to operating an A-10 away 
from a MOB. General challenges of operating a FOL in an austere location, potentially 
under constant threat of attack from the enemy require consideration. Challenges such as 
diplomatic clearances, mission approval authorities, host nation support, logistics, and 
dealing with casualties must be addressed but are beyond the scope of this paper. Each of 
the challenges addressed can be sufficiently mitigated with the proper planning, training, 
and execution. In the end, it’s about supporting the end user with fire support. The benefits 
of being able to provide persistent lethal aerial fires in any environment, untethered to a 




V. CASE STUDY: NIGER 
A. BACKGROUND 
If the U.S. Air Force is committed to fighting the war and terrorism, providing CAS 
and ISR support to forces in central Africa is likely to be required in the future. The US 
does not have the basing infrastructure in and around Africa to operate exclusively from 
MOBs. The U.S. Air Force must leverage Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) 
operations from austere locations in order to effectively support Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) in central Africa.  
The following is a hypothetical situation, but possesses similarities to Navy-SEAL-
led hostage rescues recently conducted in Yemen and Somalia.155 The proximity Yemen 
and Somalia to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti provided an easy MOB staging area for assault 
forces. If these rescue attempts took place in Central or West Africa, against a well-armed 
enemy, the mission result might have been different. This scenario highlights some of the 
advantages the adaptive basing capabilities of the A-10 brings to the joint force. For 
available air support options, this scenario draws on typical forces deployed to AFRICOM 
and CENTCOM over the past few years. 
The US confirmed through various intelligence sources that Boko 
Haram captured 15 Doctors Without Borders workers and are being held at 
a remote compound on the Nigeria, Niger border. IMINT shows the 
compound is guarded by 30-40 individuals and multiple defensive fighting 
positions (DFPs) with heavy guns up to 23mm. Intelligence indicates the 
insurgent group also possesses MANPADS and 50-watt GPS jammers 
obtained from Libya stockpiles.  
A US special operations team conducting operations in Somalia is 
tasked to execute the hostage rescue. Intel suggests the hostages will be 
moved to a new, unknown location within the week. The closest staging 
base is Niger Airbase 201 outside of Agadez, Niger roughly 250 NM away. 
The CONOP calls for 2 CV-22s to insert the team via offset infill then 
extract the team and hostages from an LZ close to the compound. Hostages 
will be transloaded to a C-17 at a temporary FOL 20 miles from the 
                                                 
155 In November/December 2014, Navy SEALs conducted 2 rescue attempts in central Yemen. 8 
hostages were rescued, two were killed during the second rescue attempt. In January 2012 Navy SEALS 
conducted a hostage rescue in Somalia, freeing two hostages from Somali pirates. 
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objective to facilitate transporting the hostages to Landstuhl Regional 
Medical Center in Germany while a medical team onboard the C-17 
provides immediate assistance. Based on the threat, the assault force (AF) 
determines airborne fire support is needed to maintain relative superiority 
throughout the mission. Based on weather, lunar illumination, and a 
potential hostage relocation, the best chance for a successful rescue is in 4 
nights from now. What options are available for close air support? 
- Armed MQ-9s are currently flying from Niger Airbase 201. MQ-9s 
carrying a mix of AGM-114 hellfire and 500 lb guided bombs are 
available. Based on the assessed enemy threat to the assault force and 
lift assets, additional fire support is needed. 
- Currently there are no Navy aircraft carriers deployed to the region, the 
closest is currently off the coast of Oman nearing the Straits of 
Hormuz156 
- Several B-1s are deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. From Qatar to 
southern Niger is approximately 2500NM. With enough tanker support 
(approximately 220,000 lbs of fuel offload) the B-1 can provide 
approximately 5 hours of coverage during the 16-hour mission.157 With 
the appropriate waivers and tanker support the mission could provide 
additional time on-station. The station time meets mission requirements, 
however a limited ability to flex on-station time with mission timeline 
and the lack of a direct fire weapon and lack of rotary wing escort 
capability does not meet mission requirements. 
- F-16s based at Aviano Air Base, Italy are 2000NM away. The distance 
is too great to launch from home, but could forward deploy to Sigonella 
Naval Air Station, Sicily and launch from there. Sigonella is 1500 NM 
from the target area. Flying a 10-hour mission with dedicated tanker 
support, F-16s could provide approximately 3 hours of coverage.158 
Flying combat missions from Sicily on 3 days’ notice could be 
challenging due to home station readiness, the diplomatic approval 
process, and flying across combatant command regions. 
- At least one USAF fighter unit (F-22/F-15E/F-16) is deployed to 
Arabian gulf area. Repositioning these aircraft to the closest suitable 
African base Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (2000NM) is still too far of a 
distance to conduct the mission. 
                                                 
156 According to https://worldview.stratfor.com/ carrier strike group locations as of 11 Oct 2018. 
157 B-1 data computed using flight planning software, provided by Maj Chris Townsend. 
158 Assumes 400T cruise speed enroute, adequate tanker support and a 12-hour duty day. 
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- An A-10 unit is currently deployed to Kandahar Airbase, Afghanistan. 
They can operate from Niger Airbase 201 in Agadez or other FOLs in 
the region and could be in place 2 days after notification with the proper 
logistical and tanker support. 
- AC-130s deployed to CENTCOM cannot operate from the semi-
prepared surface at Niger Airbase 201, and the presence of AAA, 
MANPADs, and GPS jammers exceeds the commander’s acceptable 
level of risk (ALR). 
The WARNO is given and four A-10s loaded with two GBU-54s, one 
AGM-65, seven APKWS depart Kandahar to Djibouti flown by ferry pilots. 
The four A-10 mission pilots and ten A-10 maintainers with an MRSP, 
ALS, 30mm ammunition, depart Kandahar on an MC-130 going to 
Djibouti. Day two, the MC-130 departs Djibouti enroute to Agadez with the 
four mission pilots and assault force, six A-10 maintainers, and an STS 
team. Day three is spent finalizing mission details and conducting integrated 
reversals. 
 The mission is a go for period of darkness (POD) day four. Four A-
10s arrive at Agadez flown by the ferry pilots from Djibouti and conduct 
shutdown operations to service fuel and oil, spending about two hours on 
the ground. At H-1 hour, four A-10s, two CV-22s, and an MC-130, depart 
Agadez’s 7000’ semi-prepared surface while an armed MQ-9 maintains 
overwatch on the compound. A-10s provide escort to the CV-22s inserting 
the team, while the MQ-9 maintains overwatch of the objective compound. 
The offset infill is uneventful. Two A-10s remain on station, providing 
overwatch of the AF traveling on foot to the target while maintaining 
outside audible signature. 
 The two other A-10s escort the CV-22s to the FOL location, land, 
refuel at the FARP, and wait for the next mission trigger (AF actions on the 
objective). The two A-10s on the ground takeoff to arrive at the target 
compound ten minutes before the AF arrives. As the AF establishes 
positions, the MQ-9 and four A-10s conduct a coordinated, simultaneous 
attack on the enemy DFPs and heavy machine gun locations. The A-10s 
engage enemy fighters with 30mm and APKWS laser guided rockets 
multiple times under control of the JTAC. The attacks go smooth, the JTAC 
and aircrew rehearsed them several times the day prior. Once hostile activity 
subsides, two A-10s depart for the FARP, quickly taking on fuel and 
weapons in order to support the exfil. 
 Upon exfil, the MQ-9 and A-10s again conduct preplanned strikes 
immediately prior to the CV-22s entering the landing zone. The well-timed 
attack silences the enemy activity and neutralizes the threat to the HLZ. The 
CV-22s, AF, and hostages depart for the transload site. Two A-10s take on 
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fuel at the FARP while two others provide overhead security until the 
transload is completed. All assets return to base and the FARP is collapsed 
five hours after it was opened. The mission is a success, the hostages are 
saved. A few tire ruts in the middle of a dry lake bed serve as the only 
remnants of the mission. By day seven, two days after the mission, the A-
10 pilots, maintainers, and jets are back in Kandahar, ready to conduct 
missions against the Taliban. 
The “tyranny-of-distance” the rescue team faces to conduct this mission in Niger 
combined with an enemy more heavily armed than the Yemeni rebels or Somali pirates of 
the previous hostage rescues makes this a complex and potentially high-risk mission. 
Effective air support, both ISR and Fires was required to mitigate the risk to the assault 
force. Deploying the A-10s forward, leveraging their ability to operate from semi-prepared 
surfaces, provide lift escort, and FARP in an austere location enabled this mission to be 
successful without undue risk to force. The A-10s were able to leverage some key benefits 
outlined in Chapter II: 
• The A-10s were able to deploy forward with a minimal maintenance 
package almost immediately after the WARNO was given. There were not 
unnecessary delays in waiting for airfield infrastructure upgrades, extra 
logistical support for a full unit of maintainers, or waiting for adequate 
tanker support to arrive. By sending just four jets, and a few maintainers 
and pilots, it would have little effect on flying operations in Kandahar. 
• By sending the mission pilots forward, they were able to conduct 
integrated mission planning and rehearsals with the supported force. A 
detailed understanding of the mission, and planning with the JTAC, 
allowed them to conduct preplanned strikes at the appropriate times to 
allow the AF to maintain relative superiority. These types of strikes are 
difficult to pick up on the fly without planning and rehearsal.  
• With the availability of the FARP 20 miles from the objective, the A-10s 
were able to adjust their air support to the timeline of the mission. Four A-
10s were on station during the critical times of the mission (infil, AF 
actions on objective, exfil) to provide maximum support to the assault 
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force. If the mission timeline changed (e.g. overland movement to 
objective from infil point takes longer than expected, needing more time 
on objective for SSE, hostages need to be moved to exfil point via litter) 
the A-10s could easily adjust their timeline to best support the assault 
force.  
• This mission turned out to be more kinetic than expected. The A-10s were 
able to quickly reload weapons at the FARP to ensure adequate weapons 
were on station. If this mission was only supported by tankers conducting 
air-to-air refueling, this would not have been possible. Unlike recent 
conflicts in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, there were not an abundance of 
fighter aircraft available to RIP the A-10s with a low weapons or fuel 
state.  
• Opening and closing the FOL and FARP in one POD did not allow the 
enemy sufficient time to discover and stage an attack on the location and 
did not telegraph the intent and timing of the US to conduct the rescue 
mission. Forward staging assets for multiple days would have likely sent 
warning signals to the enemy and made US assets more vulnerable to 
attack. 
This case study illustrates just one type of mission, in one region of the world that 
leveraging A-10 adaptive basing capabilities could benefit the SOF community and the 
joint force. Similar scenarios could be applied to most current and future AORs, with 
potentially higher threats and higher costs of mission failure. Conducting a rescue operation 
far from a MOB poses some significant challenges that the Air Force is potentially unable 
or unprepared to adequately support. If this operation was supported with an MQ-9 only or 
an MQ-9 and B-1 flying out of Persian Gulf, the assault force may not have possessed air 
support it needed to conduct a successful rescue operation at an acceptable level of risk and 
ultimately risking mission failure. Operating fighter aircraft from temporary FOLs, with a 
dirt runway, during one POD, in the middle of the desert is not always the optimal solution, 
but in this scenario, it enabled mission success when few other options were available. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Forward deploying A-10s to austere locations, leveraging flexible and adaptive 
basing procedures, and conducting ICTs by rearming and refueling with engines running 
provides a lethal tool to the joint force. The adaptive and untethered basing construct 
provides a rapidly deployable, flexible, survivable, and lethal fires platform capable of 
carrying out broad mission type orders to fulfill commander’s intent. The A-10 is capable 
of meeting and exceeding the intent of the National Defense Strategy to “transition from 
large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, and adaptive 
basing” to posture for the global strategic environment in support of conventional and 
special operations forces.159  
A. THE BENEFITS AND RISK OF OPERATING FROM A MOB 
The added benefits of integrated mission planning, rapid mobilization capability, 
mission flexibility, and tactical unpredictability of adaptive basing clearly outweigh the 
challenges and risks. Advances in commercial technology and military weapons systems 
make main operating bases increasingly vulnerable to enemy attack. Adaptive basing 
combined with full FARP operations provides US forces the ability to project forward into 
traditionally denied environments, operate in areas far from existing MOBs, reduce 
reliance on tanker support, remain unpredictable to enemy forces, disperse equipment and 
personnel, and reduce reaction time and increase on-station times. 
B. THEATERS, MISSIONS, AND OPLANS THAT BENEFIT FROM 
ADAPTIVE BASING AT FOLS 
Most current and future operational areas can derive benefits from a flexible basing 
posture. In the WPTO, it can mitigate China’s extensive S/S missile arsenal. In Eastern 
Europe, it can allow fighters to project forward further from tanker orbits pushed hundreds 
of miles west due to advanced surface-to-air missile systems. In Korea, it adds resilience 
and redundancy in case Osan or Kunsan become unusable. In Africa, it alleviates airplanes 
                                                 
159 Mattis, National Defense Strategy: Unclassified Summary, 6. 
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having to transit thousands of miles to conduct missions far from Camp Lemonnier. In 
future, unknown locations, it allows forces to project forward immediately and not wait for 
a MOB to be acquired or constructed. 
C. CURRENT CAPABILITY OF THE A-10 ENTERPRISE TO OPERATE IN 
AUSTERE ENVIRONMENTS 
At this time, the maintenance practices, operational training, and Air Force 
regulations do not fully support the capability and flexibility of adaptive basing. The 303rd 
Fighter Squadron is the only A-10 squadron currently trained and qualified to conduct full 
scale FARP operations in an austere environment. With a few adjustments to training plans, 
exercises, and regulation changes the rest of the A-10 enterprise and Combat Air Forces 
(CAF) can be ready to meet General Mattis’ National Defense Strategy intent.  
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACADEMIC RESEARCH. 
If the Department of Defense peruses adaptive and agile basing practices to combat 
current and future advisories more research should be done to advance the capability. 
Future topics could include: What are the desired design traits of future austere capable 
aircraft? What future platforms and capabilities should ACC and/or AFSOC procure to 
meet the intent of the NDS? How can the light attack aircraft program (AT-6 or A-29) 
advance adaptive basing capabilities? How can the Air Force effectively force package 
from a distributed posture? How can the Air Force exercise command and control from a 
distributed force posture? 
Ultimately, the A-10 community is committed to providing the best possible fire 
support to the 18-year-old private doing his part in a major combat operation, a special 
operator putting his boot on the neck of the adversary, or an aviator behind enemy lines 
trying to evade capture. Leveraging the adaptive basing capabilities of the A-10 provides 
the joint force with an effective tool to employ against tomorrow’s enemy…no matter 
where in the world that might be. 
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APPENDIX.  LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Air Force Regulations 
• Maintenance Technical Orders-Update USAF maintenance 
procedures to include full integrated combat turnarounds (ICTs), 
conducting maintenance with NVGs, reloading weapons with 
engines running, and simultaneous wing loading procedures. 
• Rewrite AFI 11-235 Forward Area Refueling Point Operations to 
include considerations and procedures for loading weapons at 
FARP locations. 
• Push maintenance and mission go/no-go decisions down to the 
lowest practical levels to enable decisions to be made locally at 
austere locations. 
• Develop MESLs specific to FOLs. 
2. Air Force Training 
• Revamp maintenance personnel training focused on austere 
operations to include additional weapons qualifications, operating 
with NVGs, performing maintenance without artificial lighting, 
operating lifts and machinery on semi-prepared surfaces, cross 
training between maintenance disciplines, manually loading 
weapons similar to Navy carrier practices.  
• Develop integrated operations and maintenance training programs 
that reinforce the skills needed to operate and survive in an austere 
environment. 
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• Build a force of ACC owned security forces personnel specifically 
trained to protect aircraft way from MOBs. The program should 
mirror AMC’s Phoenix Raven program. 
• Update unit Rap Tasking Messages (RTM) and Designed 
Operational Capability (DOC) statements to include an adaptive 
basing capability for select units and define the adaptive basing 
qualification and requirements. 
• Continue to develop and maintain pilot austere takeoff and landing 
qualifications IAW A-10 Upgrade Syllabus. 
3. Joint Operations 
• Plan and execute joint full mission profile training with 
challenging scenarios similar to those outlined in Chapter II or the 
scenario in Chapter V. 
• Develop operational plans that leverage the advantages of adaptive 
basing and FW FOL operations as appropriate. 
• Identify the contingency locations capable of FW fighter 
operations and develop a rating scale similar to AMC’s Giant 
Report to identify those locations. See Air Mobility Command 
Instruction 11-211 Flying Operations: Destination Airfield 
Suitability Analysis for more details on the Giant Report or Global 
Decision Support System (GDSS)/Airfield Suitability and 
Restrictions Report (ASRR). 
• Update airfield and runway planning documents to include 
considerations, requirements, and realistic capabilities for FW 
fighter operations at FOLs. 
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• List “adaptive basing capability” on unit deployment tasking 
messages as a requirement for deploying units.  
• Streamline the ability to operate across Combatant Command 
boundaries to leverage assets and locations outside or existing 
COCOMMs. 
• Conduct maintenance cross servicing exercises and familiarization 
between services and coalition partners 
 
4. Desired A-10 upgrades specific to austere operations 
• Upgrade additional jets with OBOGS. 
• Add a parking brake. 
• Explore options to reduce engine oil consumption or increase oil 
capacity to extend the available fight-time between required engine 
shutdowns to service oil. 
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